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BIG PHARMA MONOPOLY:
WHY CONSUMERS KEEP LANDING
ON “PARK PLACE” AND
HOW THE GAME IS RIGGED
MARK S. LEVY*
Now, more than ever before, pharmacologists are contributing medical
advances to confront ravaging disease. They are developing drugs to mitigate
the effects of Alzheimer’s, HIV, multiple sclerosis, and various forms of cancer.
To capitalize on the opportunity, brand-name pharmaceutical firms are
patenting these drugs, consequently guarding formulas and, with it, profits.
Patents grant brand-name firms market exclusivity, which essentially allows
them to set their own prices.
Even though brand-name firms are investing some of their capital to
cultivate new drugs, they also are enjoying gigantic revenue streams, absurd
profit margins, and seemingly unfettered control of their respective markets.
Consequently, sick patients are unable to afford their medication; high prices
are bankrupting consumers in the absence of reasonably-priced generic
alternatives. Despite the fact that generic drugs contain identical ingredients,
cure the same symptoms, and cost 70% less, brand-name drugs persistently
dominate their generic counterparts.
Indeed, brand-name firms are improperly preventing generic market entry.
Without generic competition, no watchdog exists to curb big pharma’s
prohibitive prices. Despite the Supreme Court’s fleeting fix in FTC v. Actavis,
which condemned reverse payment settlements that precluded competition,
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American University Law Review for their efforts throughout the publication process.
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brand-name firms are employing other tactics predatorily to extend their market
exclusivity and charge consumers unaffordable prices.
To prevent brand-name abuse and help infirm patients afford their
medication, this Comment proposes that courts apply federal antitrust law to
brand-name firms that attempt to monopolize a pharmaceutical market through
anticompetitive means, particularly by abusing Risk Evaluation & Mitigation
Strategies (REMS) and by “product hopping.” To combat exclusionary conduct,
courts should mirror the “rule of reason” framework set forth in Actavis and
apply an “enhanced” version specifically tailored to the pharmaceutical
industry, giving stronger credence to generic challengers. In addition to finding
brand-name tactics exclusionary, this Comment also proposes that courts adopt a
bright-line rule prohibiting brand-name firms from exploiting the “legitimate
business” defense to immunize their destructive conduct.
The current framework perpetuates abuse and grants brand-name firms
ostensibly indefinite monopolies. Analyzing brand-name defensive tactics
under federal antitrust law would facilitate generic market entry and
consequently moderate drug prices. Even after sacrificing their entire financial
portfolios, patients are still unable to afford their medication. This Comment
interprets Actavis as prohibiting the “legitimate business” defense and provides
a remedy to deserving consumers by preventing REMS abuse and product
hopping, fostering generic competition, and tempering excessive drug prices.
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“The chess-board is the world;
the pieces are the phenomena of the universe;
the rules of the game are what we call the laws of Nature.
The player on the other side is hidden from us.” 1
STARTING AT “MEDITERRANEAN AVENUE”
How much money would you spend to save a loved one’s life? An
individual contemplating such a quandary might consider many
options: dipping into a child’s college fund, taking out a second
mortgage, or possibly even declaring bankruptcy. How do you begin
to weigh the ultimate effect that exorbitant healthcare costs will have
on your family? People say you cannot put a price tag on a life, but
with the ever-rising prices of pharmaceutical drugs, this choice is one
millions of Americans face every day.
Consider the following scenario: doctors diagnosed Jacqueline
Racener, a seventy-six-year-old secretary, with leukemia.2 The good
news? A new drug, Imbruvica, reduces the risk of Racener’s disease
progressing by seventy-eight percent and her risk of death by fiftyseven percent.3 The bad news? The life-saving medication is
outrageously expensive; even after Medicare covered a majority of the
cost, she would still pay nearly $8000.4 Racener chose not to fill her
prescription.5 Although she could not afford her medication,

1. Richard Mills, Food Inflation Harsh Times—A New Normal, MKT. ORACLE (Apr.
9, 2011, 1:31 AM), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article27446.html (quoting
Thomas Henry Huxley). The theme of this Comment is developed from the board
game, “Monopoly.” The game is based on economic principles; players move around
the board with the objective of “becom[ing] the wealthiest player,” or the
monopolist, by buying and selling property. See Monopoly, PARKER BROTHERS,
http://www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/00009.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2016)
(explaining the rules of the game). “Park Place” is one of the worst properties to
land on: its owner is usually the strongest competitor, the rent is exceptionally
pricey, and it usually causes the trespasser to fear imminent bankruptcy.
2. Joseph Walker, Patients Struggle with High Drug Prices, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31,
2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/patients-struggle-with-high-drug-price
s-1451557981.
3. FDA Expands Approved Use of Imbruvica for Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia, FDA
(July 28, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucm406916.htm.
4. Walker, supra note 2. Before insurance, the drug costs between $116,000 and
$155,400. Id. Paradoxically, it was not until her salary was cut by forty percent that
she qualified for aid and was subsequently able to afford her prescription. Id.
5. Id.
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Imbruvica was not concerned with losing her as a customer—its
global sales were roughly $1 billion in 2015.6
Similarly, Stuart Chapin, a fifty-five-year-old teacher, was diagnosed
with colorectal cancer.7 Doctors gave Chapin just six months to live,
straining his finances and troubling his wife, who began to suffer
from an anxiety disorder.8 After spending $60,000 on medication
and exhausting his eighteen-year-old son’s college fund, Chapin
could no longer afford treatment.9 As a result, Chapin and his wife
discussed the possibility of removing his nephrostomy tube, which
would kill him in a matter of days or weeks.10
Stories like Racener’s and Chapin’s permeate our daily news cycle
and elicit mixed reactions.11 Faced with surging pharmaceutical

6. See id. (adding that AbbVie Inc., the company that owns Imbruvica, projected
sales at around $5 billion in 2020).
7. Rich McHugh & Tracy Connor, Cancer Patients Sick with Worry over High Cost of
Drugs, NBC NEWS (July 23, 2015, 10:02 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/cance
r/cancer-n397281.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Chapin’s thirteen-year-old daughter even co-wrote a novel, attempting to
raise enough money to pay for her dad’s treatment. Id. Chapin explained his
family’s predicament, stating, “[O]ur choices are lose the house or lose my life.
There’s no third choice.” Id.
11. Compare Maggie Fox, Can We Get Cheaper Cancer Drugs? More than 100 Experts
Weigh in, NBC NEWS (July 23, 2015, 5:43 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/can
cer/experts-weigh-how-make-cancer-drugs-affordable-n397336
(reporting
that
patients pay $25,000 to $30,000 in annual, out-of-pocket costs for some cancertreating drugs), and Olga Khazan, The True Cost of an Expensive Medication, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/09/an-expensiv
e-medications-human-cost/407299 (discussing the high cost of prescription drugs),
with Katie Thomas, Brand-Name Drug Prices Rise Sharply, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/business/cost-of-brand-name-presc
ription-medicines-soaring.html?_r=0 (noting that brand-name pharmaceutical trade
groups attribute high drug costs to the high costs of developing those drugs,
particularly specialty drugs used for multiple sclerosis and cancer—a pharmaceutical
executive stated that “[w]ithout the development of new medicines by innovator
companies, there would be neither the new treatments essential to progress against
diseases nor generic copies”). In another related story, doctors diagnosed Karen
Winkler, mother of three, with multiple sclerosis (MS). Are Generic Drugs Being
Delayed to Market?, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 28, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.pbs.org/ne
wshour/bb/generic-drugs-delayed-market. Doctors prescribed Winkler with Provigil,
costing $700 for a six-month supply. Id. (observing that the cost of one pill jumped
from about seven dollars to around sixteen dollars). Unfortunately, Winkler’s
medication is not the only MS drug whose price has skyrocketed. Daniel M. Hartung
et al., The Cost of Multiple Sclerosis Drugs in the US and the Pharmaceutical Industry,
NEUROLOGY (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.neurology.org/content/84/21/2185
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costs, patients are often forced to choose between their medication
In contrast, pharmaceutical companies
and their mortgage.12
increasingly profit from the same bills that choke patients.13 For
example, Martin Shkreli, former CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals,
recently raised the price of Daraprim, a drug used to treat
toxoplasmosis, a life-threatening disease seen in patients with
HIV/AIDS.14 Overnight, Shkreli skyrocketed the cost of one tablet
from $13.50 to $750, equating to a 5000% markup.15 Consequently,
he strong-armed thousands of Americans to pay somewhere between
$336,000 and $634,500 for one year of medication.16
Shkreli has been called a “morally bankrupt sociopath,” a “garbage
monster,” and “everything that is wrong with capitalism.”17 But are
we carelessly focusing on one man’s transgressions and ignoring a
deeper, underlying issue? Indeed, pharmaceutical price gouging,
rendering patients insolvent from unaffordable drugs, is not
unusual.18 Manufacturers elevate prices of life-saving drugs used to

(finding that during the past two decades, MS drug prices have “increased annually
at rates [five] to [seven] times higher than prescription drug inflation”).
12. See Lesley Stahl, The Cost of Cancer Drugs, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-cost-of-cancer-drugs/ (maintaining that most
patients are ineligible for financial aid, and that many patients must therefore either
forgo their medicine or take “half-doses” to spread out the cost).
13. See Paul Barrett, Shkreli Wasn’t the First to Hike Drug Prices—And He Won’t Be the
Last, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 23, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.co
m/news/articles/2015-12-23/shkreli-wasn-t-the-first-to-hike-drug-prices-and-he-won-tbe-the-last (discussing various drugs and their price increases).
14. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnightincrease-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html.
15. Julie Beck, The Drug with a 5,000 Percent Markup, ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/09/daraprim-turing-pharmaceuti
cals-martin-shkreli/406546.
16. Anna Almendrala, What the Daraprim Price Hike Actually Does to Health Care,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 22, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/daraprim-price-turing-shkreli_560063cee4b00310edf82060.
17. Zoe Thomas & Tim Swift, Who Is Martin Shkreli?—‘The Most Hated Man in
America’?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada34331761.
18. See Barrett, supra note 13. Additionally, Valeant increased the cost of its heart
drug by 525%, Rodelis raised its tuberculosis drug price from $20 to $360 per pill,
and Questcor ballooned its MS drug from $1235 to more than $29,000 per vial. Id.;
see also Tammy Worth, The Rising Cost of Generic Prescriptions, MED. ECON. (Feb. 25,
2015), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/r
ising-cost-generic-prescriptions?page=full (highlighting drug prices that rose from
$20 to $1829 for 500 tablets and $916 to $4489 for twenty-five vials).
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treat cancer, diabetes, and multiple sclerosis by more than ten
percent annually, a rate much higher than that of inflation.19
Brand-name pharmaceutical firms enjoy gigantic revenue
streams,20 absurd profit margins,21 and unfettered control of their
own markets22 even though generic drugs contain identical
ingredients, cure the same symptoms, and cost twenty percent to
seventy percent less than their brand-name counterparts.23
Admittedly, brand-name firms shoulder high research and
development costs,24 but, even after recouping their investments and
then some, they are still unearthing ways to circumvent federal law
and preclude competition.25 A simple statistic illustrates the blatant

19. See Barrett, supra note 13; Worth, supra note 18 (positing that some drug
prices, including those used to treat muscle pain and inflammation, rose more than
thirty percent).
20. The top five U.S.-headquartered pharmaceutical companies and their
corresponding sales in 2014 were as follows: (1) Johnson & Johnson, $74.3 billion;
(2) Pfizer, $49.6 billion; (3) Merck, $42.2 billion; (4) AbbVie (Abbot Labs), $20
billion; and (5) Eli Lilly, $19.6 billion. Big Pharma, DRUGWATCH, http://www.drugwat
ch.com/manufacturer (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
21. Elyse Tanouye, Price Markups on Generics Can Top Brand-Name Drugs, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 31, 1998, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB915062993167849000
(asserting that “branded pills can have a margin of 90% or higher”).
22. See Charles W. Schmidt, Drugs as Intellectual Property, 4 AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y:
MOD. DRUG DISCOVERY 25 (June 2001), http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/archive/mdd/
v04/i06/html/06rules.html (“Patents provide the manufacturer market exclusivity
over the formulation and the right to set its own price.”).
23. See Generic Drugs and Low-Cost Prescriptions, FTC (July 2012), http://www.consu
mer.ftc.gov/articles/0063-generic-drugs-and-low-cost-prescriptions; Facts About Generic
Drugs, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsing
MedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ucm167991.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2016) (“Generic manufacturers are able to sell their products for lower prices
because they are not required to repeat the costly clinical trials of new drugs and
generally do not pay for costly advertising, marketing, and promotion.”).
24. See Robert Weisman, Cost of Bringing Drug to Market Tops $2.5b, Research Finds,
BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/18/c
ost-bringing-prescription-drug-market-tops-billion-tufts-research-center-estimates/6m
Pph8maRxzcvftWjr7HUN/story.html (providing one research center’s estimate that
bringing a brand-name drug to market costs $2.558 billion, marginalizing “the $802
million figure in its last major study, done in 2003”); Billion Dollar Pills, ECONOMIST
(Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/8585891 (assessing that initial
research and development, marketing, and manufacturing for each new drug costs
somewhere between $500 million and $2 billion).
25. See generally Editorial Board, Sneaky Ways to Raise Drug Profits, N.Y. TIMES (June
8, 2015) [hereinafter Sneaky Ways to Raise Drug Profits], http://www.nytimes.com/201
5/06/08/opinion/sneaky-ways-to-raise-drug-profits.html?_r=0 (denouncing “devious
tactics by manufacturers of brand-name drugs to delay competition from cheaper
generic drugs”).
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abuse:
generic drugs account for eighty percent of filled
prescriptions but only comprise twenty-seven percent of overall
prescription costs.26 Unsurprisingly, brand-name pharmaceutical
firms are manipulating their market share to preserve their
disproportionate profits.27
Although private monitors exist, the pharmaceutical industry needs
a stronger, more effective watchdog: federal antitrust law. For
instance, in the recent landmark case FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,28 the United
States Supreme Court alleviated consumer coercion by holding that,
under some circumstances, antitrust law can apply to pharmaceutical
patent holders.29 Despite the Court’s momentary effectiveness in
tempering abuse, brand-name firms are utilizing other strategies to
delay or prevent generic drugs from entering their markets,
consequently allowing them to enjoy market exclusivity long past
their patents’ expiration dates and thereby harming consumers.30
Brand-name firms preclude generic competition in two main ways:
by manipulating Risk Evaluation & Mitigation Strategies (REMS) and
“product hopping.”31 The FDA requires a brand-name firm to
implement REMS to mitigate patient risk if it believes a drug is
particularly risky.32 Sometimes the FDA merely prescribes an extra
warning label, but, for a more dangerous drug, the FDA may restrict its
availability.33 Brand-name firms exploit this constraint by alleging that
the restriction prohibits them from selling drug samples to firms
wishing to engineer a generic competitor, which effectively precludes

26. Lynne Taylor, US FDA Plans Generics ‘Super Office’, PHARMATIMES (Sept. 12,
2012), http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/12-09-12/US_FDA_plans_generics_Su
per_Office.aspx.
27. See Sneaky Ways to Raise Drug Profits, supra note 25 (describing “buying off the
competition” and “product hopping” as two tactics used to increase brand-name
profitability).
28. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
29. Id. at 2227.
30. See infra Sections II.A–B (condemning gambits, specifically REMS
manipulation and product hopping, that brand-name firms employ to preclude
generic competition).
31. Id.; see also infra note 121 and accompanying text (condemning brand-name
firms for purposely limiting market access for generic brands by making it difficult for
generic brands to obtain product samples, also known as REMS exploitation); infra
note 167 and accompanying text (noting that brand-name firms engage in “product
hopping” to preserve high prices by exploiting gaps in the Hatch-Waxman Act).
32. See MARY WILLY, FDA, OVERVIEW OF RISK EVALUATION & MITIGATION STRATEGIES
(REMS) 2–7 (2012), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/NewsEvents/UCM3077
04.pdf.
33. See id.
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generic market entry.34 Brand-name firms also engage in product
hopping.35 Product hopping refers to the practice in which brandname firms “hop” to a “new” drug to preclude generic firms from
entering the market. Specifically, as a brand-name patent approaches
its expiration date, generic firms anticipatorily prepare to enter the
market by developing an imitation, or “generic,” version. Right before
its expiration, however, the brand-name firm withdraws its drug,
slightly modifies it, and remarkets it as a “new” drug.36 This maneuver
forces generic firms to abandon their development and start all over
again in an attempt to manufacture a generic version of the most
recent brand-name drug.37 Brand-name firms may “hop” several times,
each time delaying generic competitors.38 Both REMS manipulation
and product hopping hinder generic market entry and, as a result,
prevent any savings from trickling down to consumers. Because of the
lack of generic competition, pharmaceutical consumers are overpaying for their medication by millions of dollars each year.
To address these issues, this Comment proceeds in three parts.
Part I sheds light on the natural tension between antitrust and patent
law in the pharmaceutical industry. Section I.A describes the salient
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act,39 Congress’s tool that sought to
repair the pharmaceutical industry. Next, Section I.B summarizes
reverse-payment settlements, a common brand-name ploy to delay
generic market entry, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of
them in Actavis. Notwithstanding the win for consumer welfare in
Actavis, Part II explains how brand-name pharmaceutical firms are
exploiting Hatch-Waxman’s gaps through REMS manipulation and
product hopping. Part III argues that antitrust law can consistently
ameliorate big pharma’s pernicious practices. More specifically, this
Comment proposes that courts should mirror the test set forth in
Actavis, the rule of reason, and apply an “enhanced” version
specifically tailored to the pharmaceutical industry. Utilizing this

34. See, e.g., Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. CV 14-3247 (DFW/JSM),
2015 WL 5718398, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2015) (alleging that a brand-name firm’s
“REMS program [was] a scheme designed to preclude access”).
35. See infra Section II.B (outlining the ways that brand-name firms product hop).
36. See infra notes 174–78 and accompanying text.
37. Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2008) (contending that
brand-name firms slightly alter their drugs to “shift consumers from the older version
to the new” to “stave off competition from generic manufacturers”).
38. See id.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
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“enhanced” rule of reason, Sections III.B and III.C examine how
REMS manipulation and product hopping each delay generic market
entry and thus constitute exclusionary conduct, violating section 2 of
the Sherman Act.40 Finally, Section III.C rejects the “legitimate
business purpose” defense, recommending that courts adopt a brightline prohibition of the defense when brand-name firms use it to
shield antitrust liability.
I.

THE RULES OF THE GAME

Over the past 120 years, great tension has amassed between the
pillars of antitrust and patent law. The natural dividing line between
the two is blurred at best, but, in many respects, the principles of
antitrust law stand in stark contrast to those of patent law.41 On the
one hand, antitrust law “condemns exclusionary conduct” by
criminalizing monopolization; on the other hand, patent law “grants
exclusionary [conduct]” by facilitating monopolization.42
Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act sought to encumber powerful
tycoons with overzealous business tactics from wielding excessive
influence over the United States economy.43 The Sherman Act does

40. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
41. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of
Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1259 (2009) (addressing the natural tension
between antitrust and patent law and contrasting them as “anti-monopoly” and
“monopoly,” respectively); see also, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,
63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (rejecting the idea that companies have an
“absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual property as it wishes”).
42. Leslie, supra note 41, at 1260 (emphasis added) (maintaining that antitrust
law “stimulat[es] competition” while patent law “temporarily suppress[es] it”); see also
Joel S. Sprout, Note, Presumptively Illegal: The Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity in
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 763, 766 (2014) (describing the tension
between patent and antitrust law in terms of their “conflicting goals” because “patent
law grants . . . the new patent holder . . . exclusive rights to profit from the patented
product, while antitrust law combats monopolistic practices”). The Framers
specifically mentioned patent law and its salience, recognizing that despite their
anticompetitive nature, patents produce a net benefit to society. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[Patents] promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
43. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. Although pharmaceutical patent issues commonly
overlap with section 1 violations, this Comment primarily focuses on section 2.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting contracts and combinations that restrain trade or
commerce), with 15 U.S.C. § 2 (prohibiting attempted or actual monopolization that
restrains trade or commerce).
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not criminalize superior business acumen;44 it does, however, prohibit
More specifically,
monopolization that restrains competition.45
section 2 promotes competition by proscribing individuals and
business associations from possessing or attempting to possess
monopoly power while engaging in anticompetitive conduct.46
In contrast, patent law is designed to promote innovation, protect
ingenuity, and earn profits for investors.47 Patents essentially restrain
competition, but their anticompetitive effects are permissible because
the “exclusivity period encourages and finances ongoing new product
development,”
ultimately
benefitting
consumer
welfare.48
Simplistically, patent law “reimburses” the patentee for its research
and development costs by allowing it alone to profit from its fruits.49
Theoretically, that advantage is then passed on to consumers in the
form of a price-cut or the general benefit of a new product.50

44. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390–91
n.15 (1956) (reinforcing that antitrust law does not penalize those “who merely by
superior skill and intelligence” outperform competitors); see also United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (admitting that courts tend to avoid
assigning antitrust liability to monopolists who own substantial market share through
“a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”).
45. Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923)
(“The fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality of
opportunity and to protect the public against . . . destruction of competition through
monopolies . . . .”); see also United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)
(directing that the “purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies” from
“unduly interfer[ing]” with competitors).
46. To prevail under section 2, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the monopolist
(1) “engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.”
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). The antitrust issues
analyzed in this Comment concentrate on the first element: exclusionary or
anticompetitive conduct.
47. Pactiv Corp. v. Perk-Up, Inc., No. 08-05072 (DMC), 2009 WL 2568105, at *8
(D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2009) (reasoning that patent law “provide[s] an incentive to invent”
and discloses inventions to promote further ingenuity); Roberta Schugmann & Leslie
Shaw, Comment, The Application of Trade Secret Protection to Safety and Effectiveness Data of
Patented Drugs, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 463, 477–78 (1983) (deducing that patent law
encourages invention by facilitating both public disclosure and exclusivity protection).
48. Sprout, supra note 42, at 778 (providing that the tension between antitrust
and patent law does not necessarily arise from a patent’s enforced exclusivity but
from the restriction of competition).
49. See id. (opining that exclusivity from patents is “an incentive to induce
investment in innovation” (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003))).
50. See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 652 (2d Cir.
2015) [hereinafter Namenda] (recognizing that “[p]roduct innovation generally
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In addition to the inherent conflict between antitrust and patent
law, pharmaceutical patents in particular effectuate a breeding ground
for abuse and constitute an added concern for consumers.51 High
research and development costs, coupled with the potential for
astronomical profits, often attract fervent investors willing to circumvent
soft regulation.52 Unfortunately, unlike consumers in various other
markets, consumers in pharmaceutical markets are particularly
vulnerable, frequently purchasing products out of necessity rather than
convenience or luxury.53 Without adequate oversight, brand-name
pharmaceutical firms seemingly regulate their own markets; rather than
let the market play its course, they preclude competition, harming
consumers lacking the wherewithal to alleviate their symptoms.54
A. Hatch-Waxman Seeks to Keep an Eye on the “Banker”
In response to brand-name firms dominating the pharmaceutical
industry and charging steep prices, Congress sought to alleviate the
tension building between antitrust and patent law.55 As a result,
benefits consumers”), cert. dismissed sub nom. Allergan PLC v. New York ex rel.
Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
51. See generally Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context,
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 631, 632 (2007) (“The intersection of patent and antitrust law
has rarely been witness to a more protracted tension than that which currently
resides in the pharmaceutical industry.”).
52. See Weisman, supra note 24 (estimating that initial research and development,
marketing, and manufacturing costs are over $2.5 billion to bring new brand-name
drugs to market). From 2013–2014, the top ten largest pharmaceutical companies
generated $429.4 billion of revenue, spent nearly $2.9 billion on lobbying expenses
(more than any other industry), and expended more than $15 million in campaign
contributions. Big Pharma, supra note 20.
53. See generally McHugh & Connor, supra note 7 (highlighting consumer
vulnerability when faced with life-threatening illnesses and colossal drug prices).
54. See infra Section III.A (analyzing the pharmaceutical industry’s unique
characteristics); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman
Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 297–301 (2015) (chronicling the history before HatchWaxman’s enactment).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012); Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 54, at 295. Prior to
Hatch-Waxman’s enactment, the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendment to the FDCA was
the only tool utilized to curb big pharma. Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 54, at
297. However, that regulatory scheme compelled the FDA to be a “gatekeeper,”
consuming significant agency time and resources. See id. at 298. Its shortcomings
soon became obvious: most brand-name drugs lacked a generic counterpart. See id.
at 300; see also Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response
to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 302 (2001) (noting that the 1962
Kefauver-Harris Amendments failed because they required an inefficient “pre-market
approval system”).
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Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act (“the Act”) in 1984. The
Act was the federal government’s attempt to bolster both brand-name
and generic pharmaceuticals by incentivizing drug pioneers to
innovate while also subsidizing market entry costs for generic firms in
an attempt to lower overall consumer costs.56 To do so, HatchWaxman expanded patent exclusivity for brand-name firms, yet it also
created an abbreviated process for generic firms to bring their
products to market at a relatively low cost.57
The Act had three major objectives: expanding brand-name
exclusivity, mandating REMS and mitigating consumer risk, and
reducing generic market entry costs.58 To better understand the
issues that have arisen since Hatch-Waxman’s enactment, it is
imperative to recognize these goals and, in some cases, the way they
interact with some state substitution laws.59
1.

Expanding brand-name patent exclusivity
First, Hatch-Waxman requires a generic firm wishing to enter a
market to investigate and “certify” whether its drug would infringe on
a brand-name patent.60 Once the generic firm has certified that its

56. See Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on Barriers to Entry in the
Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
95–96 (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA) (asserting that the
Act intended to (1) “ensure that brand-name [firms] . . . have meaningful patent
protection and a period of market exclusivity to enable them to recoup their investments
in the development of valuable new drugs” and (2) “ensure that . . . consumers would
benefit from the rapid availability of lower priced generic versions of innovator drugs”);
Alex Galvan, Note, A Second Opinion on Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements: Why
Actavis Missed the Mark, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 567 (2014) (explaining that Congress
sought to remedy the problem of skyrocketing drug prices by “removing many of the
hoops a generic manufacturer would have to jump through to break into the
pharmaceutical market with its significantly cheaper product”).
57. See supra note 56; see also Cheng, supra note 37, at 1478 (“Congress enacted
[the Act] . . . (1) to increase the availability of low-cost generic drugs and (2) to
create new incentives for brand name drug manufacturers to make greater
investments in research and development of new drugs.”).
58. See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV) (listing the steps generic brands must take so
as not to impede on brand-name exclusivity); § 355(p) (outlining risk mitigation
strategies); infra note 72 and accompanying text (noting that generic firms enjoy a
less costly and laborious application process than brand-name firms).
59. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.2583 (West 2015) (requiring that, absent
instructions otherwise, a pharmacist must fill a brand-name prescription with a less
expensive generic substitution).
60. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). Generic firms must “certify” one of the
following: (I) no relevant patents exist, (II) any patent that is relevant has since
expired, (III) the generic firm will wait until a relevant patent expires, or (IV) the
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drug will not do so,61 the brand-name firm may initiate a patent
infringement suit, which, as a result, confers upon the brand-name
firm an automatic thirty-month period of exclusivity.62 During this
period, the brand-name, regardless of whether it possesses a valid
patent or not, retains exclusive control over the market because the
FDA will not approve the generic drug until either the thirty-month
period expires or the patent infringement suit concludes.63
2.

Mandating REMS and mitigating consumer risk
Second, although the Hatch-Waxman Act64 mandated REMS to
protect consumers from particularly harmful drugs, it unintentionally
created more opportunities for brand-name firms to abuse the patent
and antitrust regulatory schemes.65 REMS permit the FDA to require
companies to conduct a deliberative analysis of a drug’s potential
safety risks and propose strategies to mitigate those risks.66 The FDA
mandates REMS when they are “necessary to ensure” that a drug’s
benefits outweigh its risks—notably, the riskier the drug, the more
likely it will require a stronger mitigation strategy.67 Sometimes the
generic firm’s drug does not infringe on a relevant patent. Id.; see also Kesselheim &
Darrow, supra note 54, at 303.
61. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 54, at 303. To assist in
identifying potential infringement issues, brand-name firms are required to list their
patented drugs in the “Orange Book.” See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder
/ob (last updated Sept. 2016). To be listed in the Orange Book, the patent claim
must (1) constitute an approved drug and (2) be reasonably defendable in patent
infringement litigation. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2014).
62. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
63. See id.
64. Food & Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007). Although REMS were not part of the original HatchWaxman Act, the Act has since been amended to include it.
65. See § 355(p)(1)(B) (requiring a risk analysis before certain drugs can be sold);
see also Darren S. Tucker et al., REMS: The Next Pharmaceutical Enforcement Priority?,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 74 (estimating that REMS restrictions apply to nearly forty
percent of new drugs). Unlike before, the FDCA amendment now requires “drug
companies to prove both safety and efficacy of new drugs.” Shashank Upadhye &
Braden Lang, The FDA and Patent, Antitrust, and Property Takings Laws: Strange Bedfellows
Useful to Unblock Access to Blocked Drugs, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 84, 91–92 (2014).
66. See Upadhye & Lang, supra note 65, at 92–94 (comparing “low-level REMS” with
“high-level REMS,” the latter being the most restrictive and reserved for riskier drugs).
67. Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 926 (2007). The FDA may require REMS,
either before or after approval, when obliged to mitigate a drug’s risks against its
potential benefits. Id. at 926–27. The FDA considers several variables for requiring
REMS: (1) “size of the population likely to use the drug,” (2) “seriousness of the
disease,” (3) “expected benefit of the drug,” (4) “duration of [the] treatment,” (5)
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FDA merely prescribes an extra warning label on the drug, but, for
more dangerous drugs, the FDA can limit the drug’s availability for
certain classes of patients.68 One such REMS, titled Elements to
Assure Safe Use (ETASU),69 may restrict drug dispensation; for
instance, an ETASU may limit a drug’s distribution to only hospitallike settings.70 By placing distribution restrictions on risky drugs,
REMS seek to improve consumer safety.
3.

Reducing generic market entry expenses
Third, to reduce consumer costs, Hatch-Waxman created an
abbreviated pathway for generic market entry.71 Rather than file a
New Drug Application (NDA), a generic firm need only file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), thereby avoiding the
costly and laborious approval process, including clinical trials, which
brand-name firms must endure.72 Furthermore, a successful ANDA
grants firms 180 days of generic exclusivity.73 Although an approved
generic drug still competes with the brand-name drug, the exclusivity
period creates a “bottleneck” for other generic drugs.74 Because the
market lacks other generic competitors, the first generic filer may

“seriousness of any known or potential adverse events,” and (6) “[w]hether the drug
is . . . new.” Id. at 926.
68. WILLY, supra note 32, at 5, 7. Among other things, REMS may require
medication guides, patient package inserts, or communication plans. Tucker et al.,
supra note 65, at 74.
69. Tucker et al., supra note 65, at 74.
70. WILLY, supra note 32, at 7–8.
71. Kyle Virtue, Note, FTC v. Actavis: Analysis of the Court’s Decision and How It
Affects Drug Prices for Those Who Need Them the Most, 21 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST.
121, 128–29 (2014) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act increased competition by streamlining
the process for generic drug approval, consequently creating an incentive for
generic[s] . . . to enter the market.”).
72. See RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE 20 (Oct. 2006), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpd
ocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf (assessing that drug companies devote around
twelve years and more than $800 million to bring a single new drug to market);
Kenneth Glazer & Jenée Desmond-Harris, Reverse Payments: Hard Cases Even Under
Good Law, ANTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 15 (expounding that ANDAs merely
“reference” a brand-name firm’s safety and efficacy data, so generic firms “need only
supplement [their ANDA] with studies showing that [their] drugs are the
‘bioequivalent’ of already-approved brand-name drugs”); Facts About Generic Drugs,
supra note 23 (noting that generic firms can sell their products for lower prices
because they are not required to repeat costly clinical trials).
73. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).
74. Virtue, supra note 71, at 129.
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charge a higher price than the market would otherwise tolerate,
incentivizing speedy generic market entry.75
Generally, firms need only demonstrate that their proposed
generic drug is the “bioequivalent” of the brand-name it wishes to
imitate.76 Specifically, bioequivalence requires that a generic drug
contain the same route of administration, dosage, and strength as the
mimicked brand-name drug.77 By merely demonstrating that their
drug is the bioequivalent of the respective brand-name drug, generic
firms avoid the expensive and time-consuming clinical trials that
brand-name firms complete and can therefore allow the savings to
trickle down to consumers in the form of a discounted price.78
Accordingly, abbreviated generic market entry reduces entry
expenses in order to reduce overall consumer costs.
4.

Requiring pharmacists to substitute generic drugs
Finally, state “drug product substitution” laws complement the
Hatch-Waxman Act to round out the pharmaceutical regulatory
framework. In the past, prescribing physicians were often unfamiliar
with most lower-priced generic equivalents, and, because of direct-toconsumer advertising by brand-name firms, patients typically did not
ask their physicians about generic alternatives.79 As a result,

75. See id. at 129 n.44 (explaining that the exclusivity period gives an
anticompetitive advantage to the generic manufacturer).
76. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv); see also 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (2015) (defining
“bioequivalence” as the “absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to
which the active ingredient . . . becomes available at the site of drug action when
administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions”).
77. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii).
78. See Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 54, at 301–02; see also Cascade Health
Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 896 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)) (noting that “benefits . . . flow
to consumers from discounted prices”).
79. See Steinman et al., What’s in a Name? Use of Brand Versus Generic Drug Names in
United States Outpatient Practice, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 645, 646–47 (2007) (finding
that physicians used a drug’s brand-name significantly more than its generic and
suggesting unfamiliarity as a possible reason).
Brand-name firms exploit
unfamiliarity by advertising directly to consumers. Additionally, some argue that
“Direct-to-Consumer” pharmaceutical advertising causes consumers to ask for
particular brand names. See April L. Foreman, Web of Manipulation: The Learned
Intermediary Doctrine and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on the World Wide Web, 35 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 97, 99–101, 108–10 (2001) (recognizing the danger of “Direct-toConsumer” pharmaceutical advertising and observing that the FDA has previously set
moratoriums on “product specific” advertising); Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 675–76
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physicians prescribed brand-name drugs almost exclusively, and
patients rarely purchased generic drugs, unaware that generics were a
viable and equally effective alternative to their brand-name
equivalents.80 Further compounding the problem, pharmacists
lacked the lawful authority to deviate from written prescriptions to
dispense cost-effective alternates.81 Today, however, nearly every state
either requires or allows pharmacists to exercise their discretion in
substituting a lower-priced generic drug.82 In essence, federal and
state law function in tandem to increase generic drug sales and
temper pharmaceutical costs.
B. Consumers Win “Free Parking” in Actavis
Notwithstanding Hatch-Waxman’s moderate success,83 brand-name
firms, burdened with prohibitive regulatory hurdles, began using
anticompetitive tactics to recapture some of the market share that
Hatch-Waxman allotted to generic firms. For example, brand-name
firms kept generic firms out of their markets by proposing “reverse
settlements,” whereby a generic manufacturer would agree to stay out

(2007) (highlighting that from 1996 to 2005, promotional spending “grew from
$11.4 billion to $29.9 billion . . . at an average annual rate of 10.6%”).
80. See Cheng, supra note 37, at 1479–83 (arguing that direct-to-consumer
advertising can often skew consumer perceptions about brand-name drugs and
negatively influence their interactions with their physicians).
81. See id. at 1479–80 (chronicling that most state laws prior to the 1970s
prohibited pharmacists from substituting brand-name drugs for generic drugs when
the physician prescribed a brand name).
82. Vikrama Chandrashekar, Comment, Getting Even Less than What They Paid for:
The Plight of Generic Drug Consumers Under the Levine-Mensing Dichotomy, 86 U. COLO. L.
REV. 259, 271 (2015); see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to
Manufacturers of Brand-Name Medicines When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic
Drugs Has Severe Side Effects, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1847 (2013) (observing that
state substitution laws either “require the pharmacist to [notify] the patient” or
“[obtain] the patient’s consent when making a substitution”). Thirty-two states allow
a discretionary generic substitution for brand-name drugs, fifteen states require the
substitution, and the remaining three states are unclear on the topic.
Chandrashekar, supra, at 271 & n.62. Accordingly, consumers significantly benefit
from lower-priced generic alternatives. Id. at 273 (highlighting that, on average,
patients pay $17.90 for generic drugs compared to $44.50 for brand-name drugs, and
insurers pay $26.67 for generic drugs compared to $135.26 for brand-name drugs).
83. See HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES
AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, CONG. BUDGET OFF. ix (July 1998),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/pharm
.pdf (explaining that before Hatch-Waxman’s enactment, generics comprised nineteen
percent of the pharmaceutical market and rose to forty-three percent by 1996).
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of the market in exchange for annual payments.84 Although brandname firms would initiate the litigation alleging patent infringement,
they happily compensated these generic firms to eliminate generic
competition, thereby sustaining market exclusivity.85
Not uncommonly, courts dismissed antitrust challenges to reverse
settlements, consequently preserving high prices for consumers.86 In
response to the contrasting pulls of antitrust and patent law, however,
they applied analyses from both areas of law, which unsurprisingly
yielded inconsistent results.87
The decline of patent law’s “scope of the patent” test
Prior to Actavis, courts employed the “scope of the patent” test to
determine whether pharmaceutical patent lawsuits that alleged
brand-name misconduct should be dismissed.88 Specifically, a court
would ask whether “the challenged [conduct] restrict[ed]
competition beyond the exclusionary effects of the . . . patent.”89
Provided that the brand-name firm operated under a valid patent and
1.

84. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d
sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (noting that the FTC
alleged that these arrangements allowed all respective companies to share in
monopoly profits, ultimately hurting consumers).
85. See, e.g., id. at 1304–05 (elucidating that Watson pharmaceuticals attacked the
validity of Solvay’s patent for a brand-name drug, putting Watson in a position to
drive Solvay into reverse settlement). The Supreme Court later reversed the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision allowing reverse settlements, holding that such
agreements could have unlawfully restrained trade and violated federal antitrust laws.
See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–32 (emphasizing that these settlements should be
scrutinized for their “anticompetitive effects . . . against procompetitive antitrust
policies,” regardless of patent validity).
86. See, e.g., Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1312–15 (dismissing the FTC’s antitrust
claims because exclusivity “fall[s] within the scope . . . of the patent” and a simple
likelihood of a patent being invalid is insufficient to void a settlement); see also
William J. Newsom, Note, Exceeding the Scope of the Patent: Solving the Reverse Payment
Settlement Problem Through Antitrust Enforcement and Regulatory Reform, 1 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 201, 207–09 (2009) (noting that most circuits before Actavis held that as
long as the reverse settlement was within the exclusivity granted by the patent, there
was no antitrust issue).
87. See generally Newsom, supra note 86, at 209–26 (2009) (outlining the circuit
split regarding reverse-payment settlements).
88. See, e.g., Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1312 (holding that, “absent sham
litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent,” a business tactic “is immune from
antitrust attack so long as . . . it[] . . . fall[s] within the scope of the exclusionary
potential of the patent”); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F.
Supp. 2d 514, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a business tactic is immune from
attack “as long as competition is restrained only within the scope of the patent”).
89. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068 (11th Cir. 2005).
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the alleged conduct fell within the scope of that patent, the firm was
not liable under such test, even if the firm intentionally restrained
competition.90 The courts justified the “scope of the patent” test by
contending that patents should be presumed valid, and that even if a
patent was weak, it would be subject to subsequent attacks from other
generic manufacturers.91 However, a minority of courts questioned
this reasoning, arguing instead that (1) by presuming the patent’s
validity, the courts have literally “assum[ed] away” the underlying
lawsuit; (2) brand-name firms’ substantial profits allowed them to
settle repeatedly and eliminate even more generic competitors; and
(3) ultimately, the consumer would suffer from higher
pharmaceutical prices.92
2.

Antitrust law’s rule of reason applied to reverse-payment settlements
The “scope of the patent” test created a void that allowed brandname firms to drive up their pharmaceutical prices and leave
consumers aching for generic alternatives.93 Fortunately, the ultimate
resolution came to fruition in 2013 when the Supreme Court

90. See In re Ciprofloxacin, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (rationalizing that a market
sustains no injury unless a “patent is shown to have been procured by fraud, or a
suit . . . is shown to be objectively baseless”); see also Jessica Hudson Bechtel, Note, A
Framework to Evaluate Pharmaceutical Pay-for-Delays: A Balancing Test Based upon
Reasonableness, 102 KY. L.J. 501, 502, 510–14 (2014) (examining adversarial
arguments about using the “scope of the patent” test).
91. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d. Cir. 2012), vacated
sub nom. Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) (discussing
the rationale of the “scope of the patent” test).
92. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–15 (challenging the Second Circuit’s rationale
for the “scope of the patent” test and arguing that a policy favoring weak patent
elimination is within the public’s interest and consistent with the application of
antitrust law); see also Bechtel, supra note 90, at 513–14 (contending that the “scope
of the patent” analysis protects the brand-name’s “wallet” rather than the “strength of
[its] patent”); David Ernest Balajthy, Note, A Pharmaceutical Park Place: Why the
Supreme Court Should Modify the Scope of the Patent Test for Reverse Payment Deals, 20 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 341 (2013) (arguing that the test incentivizes monopolies and
encourages manufactures to raise drug prices). But see Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at
1312 (pointing out that “[i]f the patent actually is vulnerable, then presumably other
generic companies . . . will attempt to enter the market and make their own
challenges to the patent”).
93. See Susan Schipper, Note, Bad Medicine: FTC v. Actavis, Inc. and the Missed
Opportunity to Resolve the Pay-for-Delay Problem, 73 MD. L. REV. 1240, 1267 (2014)
(arguing that the “scope of the patent” test “ignores the reality” that many generic
manufacturers may have successful challenges to a patent’s validity).
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analyzed a pharmaceutical patent issue through an antitrust lens.94
In the landmark case FTC v. Actavis, Inc., a generic firm filed an
ANDA and certified that its generic drug did not infringe on any
brand-name patents.95 In response, a brand-name firm initiated
paragraph IV patent litigation, triggering the automatic thirty-month
moratorium on any generic entry.96 Notwithstanding both parties’
monetary incentive to litigate,97 the parties settled.98 Ordinarily in
settlements, the plaintiff accepts cash from the defendant in
exchange for abandoning its suit; however, unique to the situation in
Actavis, the brand-name firm (the plaintiff) paid the generic firms
(the defendants) over $200 million to abandon their ANDAs and
recuse themselves from the market for nine years.99 Due to the
settlement’s unusual nature, commentators coined this practice a
“reverse-payment settlement.”100 In response, the FTC filed a lawsuit
alleging that the parties violated antitrust laws by agreeing to share
the brand-name’s monopoly profits; ultimately, the Court agreed.101
The Court in Actavis suggested that reverse payments artificially
extended exclusivity, effectively eliminating competition and allowing

94. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (rejecting the rationale
behind the scope of the patent test as irreconcilable with antitrust principles).
95. Id. at 2229.
96. Id. Under ANDA rules, a generic drug manufacturer can make a paragraph
IV certification that its drug does not infringe on any patents or that any patents its
drug infringes on are invalid. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(IV) (2012). However, any
challenges to an ANDA certifying under paragraph IV triggers a mandatory thirtymonth hold on the application’s approval. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see also supra notes
60–63 and accompanying text (detailing paragraph IV patent litigation).
97. See Joshua B. Fischman, The Circular Logic of Actavis, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 91, 100–
04 (2016) (laying out the economic incentives of both brand-name and generic firms
to engage in reverse-payment settlements).
98. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (describing the settlement terms); C. Scott
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1579 (2006) (demonstrating that a successful
challenge to a major brand-name patent could be worth several hundred million to
the first generic to file).
99. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (conveying that Solvay, the brand-name firm,
described the $200 million as payment for promised services by the generic firms).
100. See supra note 84 (describing reverse settlements as a way for brand-name
firms to defend weak patents by paying off a generic firm).
101. See id. at 2227, 2229–30 (explaining that reverse settlements can violate
antitrust law); Schipper, supra note 93, at 1240–41 (summarizing Actavis and noting
that the Court held that such settlements must be evaluated against a “traditional
antitrust framework”).
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brand-name firms to maintain high prices.102 Compared to the riskier
alternative of trial, settling in this fashion was a more attractive option
due to its low risk and high returns.103 This profitability incentivized
reverse payments, inhibited innovation, and ultimately harmed
consumer welfare.104
Instead of applying patent law’s “scope of the patent test,” the
Court sought to repair the broken system by analyzing this novel issue
with an antitrust tool: the rule of reason.105 The rule of reason test
balances the alleged conduct’s anticompetitive effects with its
procompetitive justifications.106
Under this burden-shifting
framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by
demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct yields anticompetitive
effects.107 If the plaintiff is successful, the burden shifts to the
defendant, permitting it to offer procompetitive justifications for its
conduct.108 Here, the fact-finder considers all relevant factors to

102. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–35 (denouncing reverse payments because they
keep prices at high, “patentee-set levels” such that “[t]he patentee and the
challenger gain” and “the consumer loses”).
103. Michael Owens, Comment, A Cure for Collusive Settlements: The Case for a Per Se
Prohibition on Pay-for-Delay Agreements in Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 78 MO. L. REV.
1353, 1388–89 (2013) (arguing that the “net reward for pseudo-innovation” is greater
than “genuine innovation,” which is “harder, more costly, or less certain than
pseudo-innovation”); see also Hemphill, supra note 98, at 1580–81 (contending that
“[e]conomic modeling” demonstrates that reverse payments “provide consumers
with less welfare, on average, than seeing the litigation to completion”).
104. See Owens, supra note 103, at 1388 (contending that reverse payments “can
cause a reduction in the rate of true innovation”).
105. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236; see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (characterizing the rule of reason as a balancing
inquiry into whether conduct “promotes” or “suppresses” competition).
In
establishing whether conduct violates section 2, courts generally “apply one of three
antitrust standards: (1) per se rule, (2) quick-look analysis, or (3) rule of reason
analysis.” Virtue, supra note 71, at 137. On the one extreme, the per se rule is
appropriate when the conduct is “so inherently anticompetitive” that it should be
foreclosed without any understanding of its market impacts or justifications. See id.
(cautioning that the per se rule is used only in “rare circumstances”). At the other
extreme, the rule of reason permits defendants to offer procompetitive justifications
for their exclusionary conduct. See infra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
Somewhere in between, the “quick-look” is an “abbreviated” version of the rule of
reason analysis, dodging “an intense, lengthy process.” Sprout, supra note 42, at 773.
An abbreviated “quick look” analysis applies where an agreement’s anticompetitive
nature is obvious to anyone with “a rudimentary understanding of economics.” Cal.
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759, 770 (1999).
106. See United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003).
107. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
108. Id.
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assess the conduct’s potential economic impact, including (1)
“specific information about the relevant business”; (2) “the restraint’s
history, nature, and effect”; (3) the relevant market’s structure and
“the [defendant’s] market power”; (4) the “reasonable necessity of
the restraint”; and (5) “the presence of less restrictive alternatives.”109
At this point, defendants often proffer a “legitimate business
purpose” defense, highlighting economic efforts to maximize
profits.110 In other words, defendants may proffer a market-related
excuse for their conduct, contending that the anticompetitive effects
are merely incidental to an underlying business decision that benefits
the company.111 Pharmaceutical patent holders often claim that their
anticompetitive conduct serves a legitimate business purpose to
immunize themselves from antitrust liability; for instance, they argue
that reverse payment settlements reflect a purely economic desire to
avoid excessive litigation costs.112 Successfully invoked, the defense
shifts the burden back for the final time, and “the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs
the procompetitive benefit.”113

109. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86
(2007) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)); Michael A. Carrier,
The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1270, 1321–22
(1999); Jason A. Casey, Note, The Rule of Reason After Leegin: Reconsidering the Use of
Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Arena, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 919, 919 n.4 (2009).
110. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483
(1992) (explaining that the monopolist “took exclusionary action to maintain its
parts monopoly and used its control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share,” so
“[l]iability turn[ed] on whether ‘valid business reasons’ [could] explain” its
conduct); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 WL
1736957, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (analyzing whether the brand-name firm’s
product changes were justified by “legitimate business reasons”), aff’d, No. 15-2236,
2016 WL 5403626 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016); see also Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:
An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 852 (1989)
(pronouncing that a “denial of access is never per se unlawful,” so that a valid
“business purpose can save[] the defendant”).
111. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596–97,
600, 602 (1985) (distinguishing between anticompetitive behavior and legitimate
purposes); Areeda, supra note 110, at 852 (arguing that there are two types of
legitimate purposes, the first being context-specific and the second being more
generalized as policies advancing procompetitive behavior).
112. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (clarifying that the size
of reverse payments can provide insights into patent validity, with “unexplained
large” payments being more likely to advance anticompetitive practices).
Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that patent holders can offer “legitimate
justifications . . . under the rule of reason.” Id. at 2236.
113. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59.
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Antitrust law’s rule of reason, unlike patent law’s “scope of the
patent” test, facilitates a fact-intensive review that protects consumers by
providing generic firms a fair opportunity to prevent brand-name abuse.
Lower courts have successfully applied the rule of reason in other
reverse payment cases. In King Drug Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.114 and
In re Cipro Cases I & II,115 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
and the Supreme Court of California, respectively, expanded Actavis’s
foothold.116 However, even after the decision in Actavis, brand-name
firms have developed other tactics to maintain premium prices and
thwart generic entry.117 To provide sufficient safeguards against
manipulation, courts should apply the rule of reason to other
pharmaceutical patent issues that thwart generic market entry.
II. HOW BRAND-NAMES ARE STILL COLLECTING TOO MUCH WHEN
THEY “PASS GO”
Notwithstanding reverse payments falling out of vogue thanks to
Actavis and its progeny, brand-name firms have gradually resorted to
precluding generic competition by exploiting REMS and product
hopping.118 Seeing that generic drugs appropriate $254 billion
dollars annually from brand-name revenue, it is understandable why
brand-name firms persistently bend the rules to recoup lost profits.119

114. 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3482 (Feb. 19,
2016) (No. 15-1055).
115. 348 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2015).
116. See id. at 863–64 (holding that the exclusionary period for patent holders
should be based on the “expected life” of a patent and not the “full life”); see also
King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 403–04 (applying the Actavis rule of reason analysis to a
similar reverse payment including cash).
117. After the Court examined reverse payment settlements in Actavis, brandname firms seamlessly focused their attention on other tactics to preclude generic
competition. See infra Section III.C.1 (condemning REMS manipulation); infra
Section III.C.2 (denouncing product hopping).
118. See, e.g., In re Thalomid & Revlimid Antitrust Litig., No.: 14-6697 (KSH)
(CLW), 2015 WL 9589217, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (noting the plaintiffs’
assertion that a brand-name firm “manipulated the FDA regulatory scheme and
Hatch-Waxman Act to prevent or delay generic manufacturers” from entering the
market by “withh[olding] samples”); see also Kellie Lerner, Early Lessons from the REMS
Battlefield, LAW360 (Mar. 9, 2015, 10:22 AM), www.law360/articles/627220/earlylessons-from-the-rems-battlefield (“In their latest ploy to evade competition, brand
name [firms] are increasingly invoking their [REMS] to delay or preclude
competition from [generics].”).
119. GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 1 (2015),
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/wysiwyg/PDF/GPhA_Savings_Report_2015.pdf
(reporting a total savings of $1.68 trillion over the past ten years).
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However, their anticompetitive ploys—guzzling $5.4 billion annually
in lost savings that would have otherwise been passed on to
consumers—are a tough pill to swallow for those who cannot afford
vital medications.120 By artificially extending a patent’s life and
precluding competition, each turn around the board enables
brand-name firms to pocket more than their lawful share of profits.
A. REMS Exploitation
Brand-name firms hide behind the claim that FDA-mandated
REMS prohibit them from selling their drug samples to generic
firms.121 Of course, if the FDA finds a drug particularly risky, it will
require a firm to implement an ETASU;122 sometimes, an ETASU
limits to whom a firm may distribute its drug.123 Troubles develop,
however, when brand-name firms, saddled with a mandated ETASU,
refuse to sell their drug samples to generic firms wishing to enter the
market.124 Unfortunately, firms need those samples to obtain FDA
approval.125 It is virtually impossible for a generic firm to prove its
drug’s bioequivalence without a brand-name sample; thus, refusing to

120. ALEX BRILL, MATRIX GLOBAL ADVISORS, LOST PRESCRIPTION DRUG SAVINGS FROM
USE OF REMS PROGRAMS TO DELAY GENERIC MARKET ENTRY 1 (2014), http://www.gpha
online.org/media/cms/REMS_Studyfinal_July2014.pdf (documenting that “[n]early
40 percent of new FDA approvals are subject to REMS”). See generally Approved Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scrip
ts/cder/rems/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) (listing various prescription drugs and
their corresponding mandated REMS).
121. See Tucker et al., supra note 65, at 74 (rebuking brand-name firms for
“inappropriately limit[ing] access to product samples” that generic firms “need for
bioequivalence testing, a predicate for FDA approval of generic drugs”).
122. See supra Section I.A.2 (discussing REMS as a federally-mandated approach
for managing drugs that are at risk of abuse); see also Tucker et al., supra note 65, at
74 (noting that ETASUs are risk controls for particularly dangerous drugs that go
further than simple notification and often restrict distribution); Upadhye & Lang,
supra note 65, at 92–94 (describing different approaches to low-risk and high-risk
drugs under REMS).
123. WILLY, supra note 32, at 7. ETASUs may require that doctors who prescribe
the drug, and the facilities that handle the drug, have specialized training or that
drug patients are monitored. Id. For example, Caprelsa, a drug used to treat thyroid
cancer, requires prescribers to educate their patients about “the drug’s risk of
abnormal heart rhythms” and be “specially certified” to handle it. A Brief Overview of
Risk Evaluation & Mitigation Strategies (REMS), FDA 14, http://www.fda.gov/download
s/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/UCM328784.pdf.
124. See Upadhye & Lang, supra note 65, at 94–95.
125. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text (explaining that generic firms
must prove that their generic drug is the “bioequivalent” of a corresponding brandname drug).
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sell such samples effectively thwarts any chance for competitors to
enter the same market.126
While Congress is silent on many pharmaceutical patent issues,127 it
addressed REMS abuse in Hatch-Waxman with the following
language: “No holder of an approved covered application shall use
any required [ETASU] . . . to block or delay approval of . . . a drug
that is the subject of an [ANDA].”128 Although the statute’s plain
language seemingly prohibits a firm from abusing REMS, the statute
neither specifies enforcement procedures nor addresses
noncompliance sanctions.129 However, because reverse-payment
settlements and REMS abuse similarly prevent generic market entry,
courts should employ the plain language to function as a dagger to
the heart of brand-name efforts to monopolize, consequently curbing
abuse and protecting consumers.130
At this point, courts have resolved relatively few REMS abuse
cases.131 As was the case in Actavis, generic firms can challenge a
brand-name’s refusal to sell by demonstrating the anticompetitive
effects of that refusal under the rule of reason.132 Because this issue
has not yet reached a federal appeals court, however, lower courts
remain divided about whether generic firms should be permitted to

126. See Upadhye & Lang, supra note 65, at 94–95. If no REMS exist, generic firms
typically purchase brand-name samples through “wholesalers or distributors.” Id.
Theoretically, a firm could simply pay a patient to feign symptoms and visit a
physician to obtain samples; however, this strategy would not produce “enough
samples for reverse engineering.” Id.
127. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2242 (2013) (observing that
“Congress has repeatedly declined to enact legislation addressing” reverse payments).
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012).
129. Upadhye & Lang, supra note 65, at 95–96 (citing § 355-1(f)(8)) (noting the
absence of any administrative procedures).
130. See Tucker et al., supra note 65, at 74 (recognizing the similarity between
REMS abuse and reverse payments); see also infra Section III.C.1 (arguing that REMS
abuse constitutes exclusionary conduct).
131. See Lerner, supra note 118 (observing that there are “limited rulings to date”).
In fact, few cases have produced a motion to dismiss opinion. See, e.g., Lannett Co. v.
Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 WL 1193912, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2011)
(denying a brand-name firm’s motion to dismiss). Even fewer cases have produced a
summary judgment opinion. Kat Greene, Actelion Settles Row over Giving Drugs to
Generics Makers, LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/5
14434/actelion-settles-row-over-giving-drugs-to-generics-makers (noting that the
“judge offered little explanation for [his] refusal[] to dismiss the matter, which
ended . . . in a confidential settlement”).
132. See, e.g., Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 14-3247 (DWF/JSM),
2015 WL 5718398, at *6 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2015) (alleging that a brand-name firm
“unreasonably restrained trade under . . . a rule of reason analysis”).
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challenge such a refusal.133 Assuming the brand-name firm possesses
monopoly power,134 a court’s primary inquiry focuses on whether a
“refusal to supply product samples for certain REMS-restricted
drugs . . . constitute[s] exclusionary conduct.”135 In this context,
courts may infer a firm’s exclusionary intent by one of two means:
(1) demonstrating that a brand-name firm sacrificed profits or (2)
employing the “essential facilities” doctrine.
The “profit sacrifice” test and the “no economic sense” test
Firms generally retain the right to refuse unilaterally to deal with
competitors;136 however, antitrust jurisprudence also establishes that
this right is not absolute.137 For instance, a firm’s conduct may be
exclusionary when, in refusing to deal with competitors, it sacrifices
profits.138 Firms enjoying a substantial market share of their
1.

133. Compare id. at *9 (granting a motion to dismiss a generic firm’s complaint
challenging a brand-name firm’s refusal to sell samples), with In re Thalomid &
Revlimid Antitrust Litig., No. CV 14-6997, 2015 WL 9589217, at *17 (D.N.J. Oct. 29,
2015) (denying a motion to dismiss).
134. Indeed, this Comment assumes that brand-name firms possess monopoly
power. Although monopoly power is sometimes at issue in pharmaceutical patent
litigation—see, for example, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 123824, 2015 WL 1736957, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (holding that a generic firm
“failed to produce economically plausible evidence” demonstrating that the brandname firm wielded monopolistic power over “the relevant market”), aff’d, No. 152236, 2016 WL 5403626 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016)—a brand-name patent, for the most
part, creates an artificial monopoly, so the firm’s market share is rarely disputed. See,
e.g., Namenda, 787 F.3d 638, 646–47 (2d Cir. 2015) (conceding that the relevant
market was “undisputed” and that brand-name drugs were “the only [like] therapies
in their class . . . currently on the market”), cert. dismissed sub nom. Allergan PLC v.
New York ex rel. Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
135. Tucker et al., supra note 65, at 75.
136. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)
(acknowledging that a firm “generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with
whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently”); United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (ensuring that the Sherman Act “does not restrict” a
private firm’s right to engage and “freely . . . exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal”).
137. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985)
(conceding that a firm’s right to refuse to deal with others is not “unqualified”).
138. Id. at 608 (holding that a firm violates section 2 when it “elect[s] to forgo . . .
short-run benefits because it was more interested in reducing competition”); Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (ruling that a firm violates
section 2 when it “use[s] its monopoly power . . . to foreclose competition or gain a
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor”).
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respective market may not use their market power to intentionally
drain smaller competitors of their resources.139
The “profit sacrifice” test is one mechanism litigants employ to
demonstrate anticompetitive conduct.140
Courts may infer
exclusionary intent when a firm jettisons a sale that would have
earned immediate profit.141 In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp.,142 for example, a monopolist and a smaller competitor
operated two separate ski resorts, together controlling all of the
recreational skiing in the area.143 The smaller competitor sought to
buy lift tickets from the monopolist to create a convenient bundle
package for visitors to pay one price to access both resorts.144
Nevertheless, the monopolist refused to sell its lift tickets to the
smaller competitor.145
The Supreme Court condemned the
monopolist’s apparent willingness to “forgo daily ticket sales,”
consequently sacrificing short-term profits.146 Accordingly, the Court
found “an inference that the monopolist made a deliberate effort to
discourage its customers from doing business with its smaller rival,”
and its refusal, primarily motivated by an interest in curtailing
competition, violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.147

139. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 154 (1951) (explaining
that a firm may not “use[] its monopoly to destroy threatened competition”).
140. The Supreme Court recently clarified the profit sacrifice test in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). The
Court rejected the profit sacrifice test because the monopolist was statutorily
compelled to deal with its competitor. See id. at 409–10. By concluding that the
monopolist had no duty to deal with its competitors, the Court narrowed—but by no
means extinguished—the profit sacrifice test to require “anticompetitive malice.” Id. at
409 (deducing that a firm violates section 2 when its conduct is motivated by
“anticompetitive malice” rather than “competitive zeal”). Therefore, antitrust scrutiny
is appropriate when a firm refuses to sell a publicly available product, but not when a
statute compels the sale and provides a form of relief for the neglected competitors.
141. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
142. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
143. Id. at 588–91 & nn.3–9.
144. Id. at 593.
145. Id. at 593–94.
146. Id. at 608.
147. Id. Some critics believe that the profit sacrifice test requires that plaintiff
have a preexisting agreement with the defendant to prevail. See Novell, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1074 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]here must be a
preexisting voluntary and presumably profitable course of dealing between the
monopolist and rival.”). They highlight the importance of a prior course of dealing
to distinguish cases from Aspen Skiing. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004) (contrasting Aspen Skiing, in which a
“defendant refused to provide to its competitor . . . a product that it already sold at
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The “no economic sense” test is another tool competitors use to
challenge a monopolist’s anticompetitive conduct.148 Although
similar to the “profit sacrifice” test, the “no economic sense” test
reaches one step further: conduct is exclusionary if “it would make
no economic sense . . . but for the tendency to eliminate or lessen
competition.”149 Instead of examining whether short-term profits
were possible, this test is designed for scenarios in which a particular
event offers a “but for” analysis.150 For instance, in Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,151 Japanese companies engaged in
a conspiracy to set television prices below the feasible manufacturing
costs for American companies in order to drive the U.S. companies
out of the market.152 Because the Japanese companies maintained
such low prices, they also sustained substantial losses.153 The Court
concluded that the Japanese companies had “every incentive not to
engage in [this] conduct,” so the companies must have been striving
to preclude competition.154 Thus, sacrificing earnings to eliminate
competition sufficiently establishes a firm’s exclusionary intent.155
2.

The essential facilities doctrine
Litigants also use the “essential facilities” doctrine to determine
whether a firm’s refusal to sell its goods or services to competitors

retail”). However, cases since Trinko demonstrate that the doctrine is alive and well.
See, e.g., Safeway Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 761 F. Supp. 2d 874, 895 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(holding that the challengers “offer[ed] sufficient evidence . . . with respect to
whether Abbott’s conduct constituted a violation of its antitrust duty to deal”).
148. See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 950–51 (6th
Cir. 2005) (challenging a monopolist-airliner that dropped its prices to a predatory
level and operated at a loss to drive out a competitor, then raised its prices shortly
after the competitor’s exit); Novell, 731 F.3d at 1075 (concluding that a section 2
violation requires “that the monopolist’s refusal to deal was part of a larger
anticompetitive enterprise, such as . . . seeking to drive a rival from the market or
discipline it for daring to compete on price”).
149. Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The “No
Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 413 (2006).
150. Vikram Iyengar, Should Pharmaceutical Product Hopping Be Subject to Antitrust
Scrutiny?, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 663, 680 (2015) (contrasting the “profit
sacrifice” test with the “no economic sense” test, which “looks at the conduct as a
whole, over time”); Werden, supra note 149, at 420.
151. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
152. Id. at 597.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 595.
155. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
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constitutes exclusionary conduct.156 The Court first considered the
doctrine in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,157 in which a single
utility company owned the sole means to distribute electric power in
a given service area.158 After time, some municipalities sought to
replace the private company with a public utility system.159 To begin
operating, the municipal system required access to the monopolist’s
power; refusing to grant such access eliminated the municipality’s
“threatened competition” and forced consumers to continuously
employ the monopolist.160
The Court determined that the
monopolist’s refusal constituted exclusionary conduct, explaining
that a firm may not refuse to deal with competitors who require a
facility to function.161
In other words, antitrust laws protect
competitors that wish to enter a market but that are unable to
“practically or reasonably duplicate” an essential product or facility
without the monopolist.162 The doctrine is commonly used in “(1)
transportation systems, such as highway and road systems, bridges,
railways, airline systems, and ports; (2) communication systems, such
as telephone networks and postal services; (3) governance systems,
such as court systems; and (4) basic public services and facilities, such
as schools, sewers, and water systems.”163 To prevail, a firm must
demonstrate that the product or facility is either impossible or
“economically infeasible” to duplicate.164 Notwithstanding its recent
156. See, e.g., MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.
1983) (cautioning that by controlling an essential facility, a monopolist can exploit
their monopoly power in one market to extend their control in another market).
157. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
158. Id. at 368.
159. Id. at 368–69.
160. See id. at 377 (noting explicitly that the monopolist was in violation of
antitrust laws).
161. See id. at 378 (accepting the lower court’s argument that the monopolist’s
reasoning for refusing to sell was solely based on its fear that the competitor might
erode its position).
162. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir.
1983) (providing that there are four elements in the essential facilities doctrine: (1)
the monopolist must control the essential facility, (2) the competitor must be unable
to duplicate the essential facility, (3) the monopolist must deny the competitor the
use of the facility, and (4) the situation must be one where the facility could feasibly
be provided).
163. Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 WIS. L.
REV. 359, 371–72 (2008).
164. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 546 (9th Cir.
1991) (maintaining that the essential facilities doctrine requires that a firm’s “facility
gives [it] the power to eliminate competition”); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d
982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“To be ‘essential’ a facility need not be indispensable; it is
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criticism and reconsideration in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,165 the essential facilities doctrine still
has a pulse and can be used in other contexts.166
B. Product Hopping
In addition to reverse-payment settlements and REMS
manipulation, firms exploit the gaps in Hatch-Waxman to preserve
high prices through product hopping.167 In the pharmaceutical
patent realm, state drug substitution laws complement overarching
federal law.168 Generic firms benefit from the interplay between
federal and state law: federal law abbreviates their market entry while
state law compels pharmacists to substitute brand-name drugs with
their generic counterparts.169 To profit from these advantages,
generic firms need only prove that their drug is the “bioequivalent”
of a corresponding brand-name drug.170
To avoid losing market exclusivity from generic competition,
however, brand-name firms “hop” from product to product,
precluding generic market entry in the process. As a brand-name
patent approaches its expiration date—or draws near the “patent
cliff”—the prospect of losing market share becomes imminent.171

sufficient if duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible and if denial
of its use inflicts a severe handicap on potential market entrants.”).
165. 540 U.S. 398 (2004); see Upadhye & Lang, supra note 65, at 106 (commenting
that pundits have cited Trinko “as a death knell for the essential facilities doctrine”).
166. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (considering the essential facilities doctrine and
“find[ing] no need either to recognize it or to repudiate,” but rather noting “the
indispensable requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability of access”);
Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2013) (analyzing and
applying the essential facilities doctrine); see also Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory
Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1193 (1999) (“Although the essential
facilities doctrine has been the target of some distinguished critics, the [doctrine]
has enjoyed persistent, even growing, popularity . . . .” (footnote omitted)). But see
Waller, supra note 163, at 365 (scrutinizing that “all subsequent essential facilities
doctrine cases [after Trinko] have been unsuccessful”).
167. Product hopping can be defined as “a strategy in which a firm manages the
lifecycle of a product by transitioning consumers to a new version or design.”
Richard J. Gilbert, Not Another Drug! Antitrust for Drug and Other Innovations,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 38.
168. See supra Section I.A.4 (detailing state drug product substitution laws, which
either require or permit pharmacists to distribute generic alternatives).
169. See supra Section I.A.4.
170. See supra Section I.A.4.
171. See Rizwan Ahmed, The Patent Cliff: Implications for the Pharmaceutical Industry,
TRIPLE HELIX ONLINE (July 10, 2014), http://triplehelixblog.com/2014/07/the-pate
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Meanwhile, generic firms anticipate the opportunity and start their
ANDAs, preparing to enter the market upon the patent’s
After a patent expires and generic firms start
expiration.172
competing, a brand-name firm will generally lose up to ninety
percent of its market share, equating to billions of dollars in lost
profits.173 To avoid this outcome, immediately before its patent
expires, a brand-name firm withdraws its drug from the market and
introduces a slightly new version of the same drug. Needing to mimic
precisely the corresponding brand-name drug to enter the market,
producing this “new” brand-name drug forces generic firms to start
their ANDAs all over again, effectively delaying their market entry.174
Brand-name firms utilize one or more of the following strategies to
“hop” from one product to the next: (1) switching from once-daily to
twice-daily medication,175 (2) altering the drug’s dosage,176 (3)
replacing a single score tablet with a dual score tablet,177 or (4)
changing the route of its administration.178

nt-cliff-implications-for-the-pharmaceutical-industry (“[T]he pharmaceutical industry
will lose upwards to $127 billion in brand spending by 2016 due to patent expiration
and cheaper generics in the market.” (citation omitted)).
172. See id.
173. Robert Williams, Patent Deaths Spell Danger for These Firms, WALL ST. DAILY
(Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2014/11/03/patent-expiration
(“[O]nce a drug has lost its hallowed patent protection and lower-priced generic
brands enter the market, the original developer can see sales crash by up to 90%.
Hardly surprising, given that generic drugs average about 30% of the cost of the
brand name.”); see also id. (positing that when Celebrex’s patent expires, the brandname firm will lose $3 billion in annual sales).
174. See Lars Noah, Product Hopping 2.0: Getting the FDA to Yank Your Original
License Beats Stacking Patents, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 161, 165 (2015)
(censuring brand-name firms that “routinely introduce new and improved versions
of successful drugs as their patents on older products wind down and generic rivals
prepare to enter the market”); see also Cheng, supra note 37, at 1472 (contending
that brand-name firms “stave off competition from generic manufacturers” by
making a “slight alternation to their prescription drug . . . to shift consumers from
the older version to the [newer one]”).
175. See, e.g., Namenda, 787 F.3d 638, 648 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Allergan PLC v. New York ex rel. Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
176. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015
WL 1736957, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015), aff’d, No. 15-2236, 2016 WL 5403626 (3d
Cir. Sept. 28, 2016).
177. See, e.g., id.
178. See, e.g., In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone)
Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 673–74 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (switching from film to
tablets); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 422–23 (D. Del.
2006) (switching from capsules to tablets).
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To prevail in an antitrust suit that alleges product hopping, a
generic firm must establish that the brand-name product hop
constituted exclusionary conduct.179 Currently, the leading case in
this area is New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC
(“Namenda”),180 in which a brand-name firm manufactured a twicedaily drug for individuals suffering from Alzheimer’s disease.181 As
the brand-name patent approached its expiration date, generic firms
began the abbreviated, albeit still demanding, ANDA process to
prepare to enter the market.182 To avoid the looming patent cliff, the
brand-name firm introduced a new once-daily version of the drug
and withdrew its twice-daily drug from the market.183 Though the two
drugs had the “same active ingredient and the same therapeutic
effect,”184 the generic firm could not bring its drug to market because
its twice-daily generic drug, developed to mimic a twice-daily brandname drug, was not the “bioequivalent” of the now once-daily brandname drug.185 Because state drug substitution laws only benefit
generic drugs that are the exact “bioequivalent” of a corresponding
brand-name drug, the generic firm was forced to start another ANDA
for the once-daily medication.186 The Second Circuit affirmed the
district court’s preliminary injunction against the hard-switch because
it prevented consumers from purchasing a generic version of the
twice-daily medication: by “hopping” from a twice-daily tablet to a
once-daily tablet, the brand-name firm was able to effectively thwart
generic competition, pocketing, for itself, consumer savings.187
In reaching its conclusion in Namenda, the Second Circuit relied in
part on Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.188 In that case, Kodak
introduced a new camera, which could only be operated with a new
type of film.189 A competitor alleged that Kodak inappropriately used
its monopoly power in the film market to monopolize the camera

179. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of section 2).
180. 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed sub nom. Allergan PLC v. New York
ex rel. Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
181. Id. at 642. The brand-name drug generated approximately $1.5 billion in
annual sales in 2012 and 2013. Id. at 647.
182. Id. at 642.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 647.
185. Id. at 643.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
189. Id. at 267–68.
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market, consequently precluding competition.190 However, the court
explained that the concurrent introduction of a new film and a new
camera “did not coerce camera purchasers” because Kodak did not
remove its old films from the market, so customers still had
choices.191 Thus, the Namenda court concluded, a monopolist that
introduces a slightly new product, but keeps its old product on the
market, does not necessarily violate section 2 of the Sherman Act;
however, a monopolist that withdraws its old product, forcing
consumers to switch to its new product, may violate section 2.192
Although Hatch-Waxman sought to benefit pharmaceutical
consumers, brand-name firms relentlessly exploit the regulatory
framework by virtue of reverse payment settlements, REMS
manipulation, and product hopping. In Actavis, the Supreme Court
marginally tempered brand-name gambits, but abuse persists
nonetheless.
Without a generic antidote, no cure exists for
consumers unable to afford ravenous brand-name prices.
III. NO “CHANCE CARD” CAN MAKE THIS GAME FAIR
Despite Hatch-Waxman’s attempt to shield consumers from brandname firms’ insatiable hunger for profit, Congress overlooked gaps in
the Act that actually facilitate excessive pharmaceutical prices.193
Brand-name firms employ exclusionary strategies—specifically, REMS
manipulation and product hopping—to preclude generic market
entry.194 Although it seems natural to view pharmaceutical patent
issues through a patent law lens, patent law alone cannot rectify a
brand-name firm’s manipulation of the existing rules, allowing brandname firms to continue thriving at the expense of the pharmaceutical
consumer.195 Accordingly, courts should turn to antitrust scrutiny to
make the game fair again. When confronted with novel, preclusive
brand-name tactics, courts should use Actavis as a model to protect
190. Id. at 267–68, 278.
191. Id. at 287.
192. See id. at 288 (dismissing a competitor’s antitrust suit because it failed to
demonstrate that the monopolist “dissuaded” consumers from purchasing its old
camera because its new film was only compatible with its new camera).
193. See supra Part II (delineating patent issues that have surfaced since Actavis).
194. See infra Sections III.A–B (highlighting that manufacturers are able to
manipulate their markets because the pharmaceutical system is prone to
monopolization).
195. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1308–09, 1311 (11th Cir.
2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (applying the scope
of the patent test and explaining that “any new exclusionary rights the holder buys to
add to that bundle do not fall within the scope of the patent grant”).

LEVY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

280

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/31/2016 8:18 PM

[Vol. 66:247

consumers. Further, not only should courts find that such tactics
constitute exclusionary conduct, but they also should apply a brightline rule that prohibits those firms from exploiting the “legitimate
business purpose” defense.
A. Examining Pharma’s Unique Characteristics Is No Smooth Ride on the
“B. & O.”
Pharmaceutical commerce is comprised of many moving parts,
rendering a need—and hope—that no one part breaks.196 But the
industry is no well-oiled machine: parts frequently break and require
repair.197 Understanding the industry’s salient characteristics—namely,
its vulnerability to monopolization and price-detached consumers—is
necessary to appreciate its need for special antitrust treatment.
Industries driven by monopolies generally benefit from additional
oversight.198 Telephony, for instance, is an industry fraught with
regulation.199 Because (1) its consumers highly value products like
telephones and (2) market entry barriers like constructing phone
lines are exceptionally expensive, competition is unlikely to thrive
naturally.200 The pharmaceutical industry, similarly, necessitates an
added layer of protection for consumers: drugs have an extremely
high demand, often meaning the difference between life and death,
and have exceptionally high fixed costs, all of which tempt
manufacturers to monopolize their markets.201 Regardless of whether

196. See ALISON MASSON & ROBERT L. STEINER, FTC, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION
LAWS 5 (1985) (“The institutions of the prescription drug market are markedly
different from those in most other product markets.”).
197. See Namenda, 787 F.3d 638, 645–46 (2d Cir. 2015) (illustrating that “the
pharmaceutical market is not a well-functioning market” because physicians, as
prescribers, are disconnected from a drug’s pricing, and patients, as payers, have
little ability to choose), cert. dismissed sub nom. Allergan PLC v. New York ex rel.
Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015); see also Claude E. Barfield & Mark A.
Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation,
Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185,
234 (1999) (maintaining that “consumer welfare suffers” when pharmaceutical
companies employ tactics to “maximize profits”).
198. See JERRY KANG, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 73 (4th ed. 2012) (noting
that in natural monopolies, “[e]ven robust competition . . . eventually lead[s] to a
single firm prevailing over all others”).
199. See id. at 73–75 (providing an overview of the monopoly issues within telephony).
200. See id. at 75 (explaining that “only one firm will prevail in such a natural
monopoly market” and that “potential competitors will result in wasteful duplication
of infrastructure because competition will be short-lived”).
201. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
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it ultimately serves one patient or one-thousand patients,
pharmaceutical firms must expend the initial time and money on
research and development.202 This extremely risky “sink-or-swim”
reward system deters market entry and decreases overall
competition.203 As a result of the unique features associated with
industries like telephony and pharmaceuticals, such industries may
require additional scrutiny not explicitly prescribed by Congress.
Additionally, in contrast to consumers in most other industries,204
the pharmaceutical consumer retains no opportunity to actively
“shop” around in the market.205 In fact, the consumer cannot even
purchase a “product” without first obtaining a prescribing physician’s
By ceding all decision-making to prescribing
permission.206
physicians, consumers surrender their “bargaining power.”207 Not
only does the physician choose which drug to prescribe, but insurers
often pay most of the bill, thus effectively eliminating any incentive to
consider the price.208 Furthermore, when consumers do ask their
202. See supra Sections I.A.2–3 (elaborating on the FDA-approval process that
pharmaceutical firms endure).
203. Cf. KANG, supra note 198, at 73–74 (examining “natural monopolies” and
characterizing telephony as an industry that has “expensive prerequisites”—namely,
“phone lines and building infrastructure”—to market entry).
204. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir.
1979) (analyzing the photographic industry, noting that “[u]nless consumers desired
to use the [new] camera for its own attractive qualities, they were not compelled to
purchase [the new film]”).
205. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 374 (2007) (discussing that “doctors who prescribe
drugs,” not their patients, are the “principal targets” of pharmaceutical firms).
Brand-name firms advertise directly to patients who then may request certain drugs
to their prescribing physician; the physician “may find it more expeditious” to
prescribe the patient’s requested product rather than “exercise their own
independent professional judgment.” Id.
206. See MASSON & STEINER, supra note 196, at 5 (explicating that the physician,
rather than the consumer, “[makes] the choice among brands” because “[a]
physician’s prescription is a necessary precondition for the purchase of a
prescription drug”).
207. See David Wolman, Drug Prices Are Too Damn High. Here’s How to Fix Them,
WIRED (Dec. 1, 2015, 6:40 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/rising-drug-costs
(contrasting “typical” markets, where “forces like competition and regulation help
keep prices down,” with the pharmaceutical industry, where consumers lack
“bargaining power”).
208. See Namenda, 787 F.3d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 2015) (yielding that the prescribing
physician “may not know or even care about the price and generally has no incentive
to take the price into account”), cert. dismissed sub nom. Allergan PLC v. New York ex
rel. Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015); Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical
Gatekeepers, 47 IND. L. REV. 363, 369 (2014) (“Physicians themselves do not pay for
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physicians about specific drug options, they usually suggest brandname drugs.209 Pharmaceutical companies burn outrageous amounts
of money on advertising to influence consumers, spending over $27
billion on drug promotion in 2012 alone.210 Although generic
pharmaceuticals cost almost seventy percent less than their brandname counterparts, the continual proclivity for prescribing brandname drugs supports a system that is prone to abuse.211
Consequently, because of the pharmaceutical industry’s vulnerability
to monopolization and the disconnect between consumers and the
prices they pay for drugs, brand-name firms enjoy unique
opportunities to manipulate their markets, often going unnoticed.212

their patients’ drugs, so there is no direct financial disincentive to prescribe any
given medicine.”); MASSON & STEINER, supra note 196, at 6 (examining the price
disconnect in the pharmaceutical industry, noting that “physicians’ incentives to
choose the most cost-effective drug seem weak”).
209. See Ranit Mishori, Some Doctors Insist on Brand-name Drugs Even When Cheaper
Generics
Are
Available,
WASH.
POST
(July
11,
2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/some-doctors-insist-on-brand-name-drug
s-even-when-cheaper-generics-are-available/2011/06/13/gIQAmC0L9H_story.html
(detailing that some physicians write on prescriptions “Dispense as Written” to avoid
a generic substitution, ensuring that the patient receives a brand-name drug).
210. See Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and Its Influence
on Physicians and Patients, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov. 11, 2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persua
ding-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-marketing-and-its-influence-on-physicia
ns-and-patients (highlighting that $24 billion was expended on marketing towards
physicians and that the remaining $3 billion was spent on direct consumer marketing).
211. Generic Drugs and Low-Cost Prescriptions, supra note 23.
212. See Bureau of Consumer Protection, Drug Product Selection: Staff Report to the
FTC, 2–3 (Jan. 1979) (conceding that the normal “forces of competition do not work
well” in the pharmaceutical market because “the consumer who pays does not
choose, and the physician who chooses does not pay,” eliminating a patient’s
“influence in determining which products they will buy and what prices they [will]
pay”). Although many times health insurance companies carry the burden of
expensive pharmaceuticals, the insurer ultimately recoups those high costs through
high healthcare premiums. See Healthcare Is Killing Us, GALLUP BUS. J. (Apr. 17, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/businessjournal/151862/healthcare-killing.aspx
(characterizing the costs of the “wars in Afghanistan and Iraq” as “tiny compared to
healthcare costs”). Indeed, healthcare insurance is one of the most lucrative
industries in the United States. See Thomas A. Bass, The Double Game of the U.S. Health
Insurance Companies, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.co
m/thomas-a-bass/the-double-game-of-the-us_b_1558794.html (remarking that U.S.
health insurers hiked their premiums by 9% and “just finished banking their third
year of record-breaking profits”). For example, in 2011, UnitedHealthcare netted
over $4.6 billion in profits. Id.
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B. Mirroring an “Enhanced” Rule of Reason Framework from Actavis
Bearing in mind that the pharmaceutical industry is susceptible to
abuse, its corresponding antitrust test should reflect its unique
characteristics. The rule of reason is a sensible legal test that provides
adversaries the opportunity to rebut each other’s allegations,
effectively preventing brand-name firms from gaming the system.213
Not only should courts mirror Actavis by applying federal antitrust law
to REMS manipulation and product hopping, but they also should
apply an “enhanced” rule of reason that is specifically tailored to the
pharmaceutical patent context, methodically scrutinizing a brandname firm’s anticompetitive conduct.214 Recognizing that a “per se
illegal” determination for REMS manipulation and product hopping
may be too extreme, courts should alternatively apply an “enhanced”
rule of reason that gives stronger credence to generic firms that
demonstrate a brand-name firm’s anticompetitive conduct.215 Such
an “enhanced” rule of reason still provides brand-name firms the
opportunity to rebut their conduct’s illegality and proffer
procompetitive justifications. However, courts should apportion
more weight to the anticompetitive effects of brand-name conduct,
rendering it more difficult for the procompetitive justifications to
outweigh the anticompetitive effects and, consequently, more
difficult for brand-name firms to take advantage of consumers.
Anticompetitive conduct in the pharmaceutical industry carries the
potential for particularly devastating results.216 For instance, a
suffering cancer patient who cannot afford his or her medication
evokes a very different response than a consumer who is forced to pay

213. See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text (explaining that the initial
burden is on the generic firm to establish that the brand-name firm’s conduct was
exclusionary, which then shifts the burden to the brand-name firm to offer
procompetitive justifications for its conduct).
214. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (adopting the rule of
reason and noting that “trial courts can structure antitrust litigation so as to avoid the
use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis and consideration
of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on the
basic question”).
215. Compare Joshua P. Davis, Applying Litigation Economics to Patent Settlements: Why
Reverse Payments Should Be Per Se Illegal, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 255 (2009) (arguing for
reverse payments to be per se illegal), with Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (recognizing
that, in some instances, reverse payments could be legal).
216. See supra Section III.A (examining the unique pharmaceutical industry and its
characteristics).
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more for a Budweiser beer.217 By pressing their thumb on the scale
and favoring generic market entry, courts would allow brand-name
firms to justify their conduct, but they also would compensate for the
pharmaceutical industry’s susceptibility to abuse.218 Accordingly,
courts should limit the application of the “enhanced” rule of reason
to vulnerable industries such as pharmaceuticals.
Indeed, courts have already shown a willingness to apply an
“enhanced” rule of reason in other pharmaceutical patent litigation.
For example, the Supreme Court arguably applied it in Actavis.219
Despite the Court’s strong preference for settlements, generally
presuming their legality, it nonetheless held that a brand-name firm’s
settlement may have violated federal antitrust law.220 Moreover, in
applying Actavis, lower courts have effectively discouraged brand-name
firms from wielding their monopoly power to coerce consumers.221 In
King Drug, for instance, the Third Circuit expanded Actavis’s foothold,
holding that brand-name settlements that offer the alleged-infringer
premature market entry, rather than a cash-payment like in Actavis,
may likewise have violated the Sherman Act.222 Additionally, in In re
Cipro Cases I & II, the Supreme Court of California applied Actavis to
the Cartwright Act,223 a California state analog of the Sherman Act.224

217. Compare supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text (identifying specific patients
who cannot afford their medication), with Chad Bray & Michael J. de la Merced,
Anheuser-Busch InBev Approaches SABMiller on Possible Takeover, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/business/dealbook/anheuser-buschinbev-takeover-sabmiller.html (elucidating the potential dangers from two beer
companies merging).
218. See supra Section III.A (examining the pharmaceutical industry’s susceptibility
to monopolization and price-detached consumers).
219. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (appreciating “the value of settlements,” but
concluding nonetheless “that this patent-related factor should not determine the result”).
220. See id.; see also United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853,
855–56 (2d Cir. 1998) (indicating the “strong public policy which encourages”
settlements); Hubb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 85 A.3d 836, 844 (D.C. 2014)
(averring that courts “encourage[] settlements and . . . presume that a settled
amount is fair and arrived at in good faith”).
221. See, e.g., King Drug Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 403 (3d
Cir. 2015) (finding that the holding in Actavis could not be narrowed only to the
“reverse payments of cash”), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3482 (Feb. 19, 2016)
(No. 15-1055); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 863–65 (Cal. 2015) (using
Actavis to emphasize the antitrust issues involved in the case).
222. See King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 403 (equating the value of cash payments with
the value of early market entry).
223. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720–16728 (West 2016).

LEVY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/31/2016 8:18 PM

BIG PHARMA MONOPOLY

285

As these cases demonstrate, the rule of reason is an ideal intermediary
to repudiate anticompetitive conduct and accurately determine
whether brand-name conduct is injurious to consumer welfare. Given
a brand-name firm’s predisposition to engage in anticompetitive
manipulation, courts should mirror Actavis and impute a stronger
presumption against brand-name firms that preclude generic
competition through REMS manipulation and product hopping.
C. Brand-Names Should “Go Straight to Jail Without Passing Go” for
Exclusionary Conduct
With little opposition to their ploys, brand-name firms are
seemingly free to exploit the rules of the game. Indeed, brand-name
firms possess the monopoly power to delay or avert generic market
entry and consequently harm consumers.225 Applying the same rule
of reason analysis that the Supreme Court used in Actavis, courts can
hold pharmaceutical companies accountable for injuring consumer
welfare, sustaining unaffordable prices, and effectively hindering
feeble patients from a successful recovery. Not only do REMS
manipulation and product hopping constitute exclusionary conduct,
but such gambits frustrate an underlying purpose of HatchWaxman.226 Antitrust scrutiny would adequately shield anguished
consumers from brand-name firms manipulating the rules.
1.

REMS manipulation constitutes exclusionary conduct
Employing an “enhanced” rule of reason, a generic firm or
consumer first needs to demonstrate a brand-name ploy’s

224. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d at 863 (employing the rule of reason by
extending Actavis’s principles “into the patent arena to prohibit a patentee’s
purchase of a potential competitor’s consent to stay out of the market”).
225. See Seth Silber et al., “Good Luck” Post-Actavis: Current State of Play on “Pay-forDelay” Settlements, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 7, 9 (Nov. 2014), https://www.wsgr.com/pu
blications/PDFSearch/silber-1114.pdf (recognizing that reverse payments are
attracting attention around the world, and arguing that “[o]ther [c]ountries [are]
[l]ikely to [f]ollow” the U.S. courts due to their successes moderating abuse). But see
Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements After Actavis: Three
Questions and Proposed Answers, FTC (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/public_statements/591131/141010actavisspeech.pdf (contending that
“months after the Supreme Court’s decision, the post-Actavis landscape remains
unsettled”).
226. See supra Section I.A (describing Hatch-Waxman as a mechanism for
bolstering brand-name pharmaceuticals by providing incentives for innovation and,
at the same time, a mechanism for decreasing the market entry costs of generic
pharmaceuticals).
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anticompetitive effects and deem such conduct “exclusionary.”227
Firms generally do not have a duty to deal with one another, but
brand-name firms should be required to do so when they refuse to
sell their samples to generic firms.228 When they refuse to deal,
brand-name firms forsake potential profits and deny generic firms a
“facility” that is “essential” for market entry. Brand-name firms
disguise their refusal as REMS compliance, but their conduct is
intentionally predatory and severely impairs consumer welfare.
Accordingly, their anticompetitive effects outweigh their
procompetitive justifications, so courts should determine that such
conduct violates section 2 of the Sherman Act.
a.

Refusing to sell makes “no economic sense”

First, the refusal to sell samples satisfies both the profit sacrifice test
and the “no economic sense” test, constituting exclusionary conduct.229
Although a section 2 violation requires exclusionary conduct, conduct
that demonstrates a firm’s exclusionary intent is also sufficient.230
Courts can infer exclusionary intent from the mere fact that a forprofit firm rejected an otherwise profitable transaction.231
When firms restrain commerce by refusing to sell to competitors,
firms should enjoy little-to-no-defense to justify their conduct.232 In
Aspen Skiing, for example, a ski resort refused to sell its lift tickets to a
competitor that wished to create its own bundle package.233 Because
the resort’s lift tickets were publicly available and it would have

227. See supra Section III.B (articulating an “enhanced” rule of reason).
228. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009)
(asserting that the general rule tolerates a firm’s discretion “to choose the parties
with whom they will deal [and] the prices, terms, and conditions of that dealing”).
229. See supra Section II.A.1 (outlining the profit sacrifice and “no economic
sense” tests).
230. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (prohibiting attempted monopolization); Tucker v.
Apple Comput., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (inferring that
forgoing “sales to prospective customers” is indicative of “anticompetitive malice
rather than ‘competitive zeal’”).
231. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 409 (2004) (maintaining that the “unilateral termination of a voluntary (and
thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggest[s] a willingness to forsake shortterm profits to achieve an anticompetitive end”).
232. See Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1077 (10th Cir. 2013)
(“The point of the profit sacrifice test is to isolate conduct that has no possible
efficiency justification.”).
233. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 593 (1985).
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instantly profited from the transaction, the Court held that the refusal
supported an inference of a deliberate, anticompetitive purpose.234
Similarly, brand-name firms operating lawful monopolies through
their patents should not be able to exploit their market share to
impede generic competition.235 Just as the monopolist in Aspen Skiing
abandoned revenue by refusing to sell its lift tickets, brand-name
firms abandon potential revenue by refusing to sell their samples to
generic firms.236 Indeed, a brand-name firm can lose up to ninety
percent of its market share when a generic product enters its market,
which corresponds to billions of dollars in lost profits.237 Recognizing
that refusing to sell samples to generic firms will delay or even
prevent generic market entry, brand-name firms have nothing to lose
and everything to gain.
Brand-name firms clearly sacrifice short-term profits by refusing to
sell their samples, and their refusal also satisfies the “no economic
sense” test. This test applies a “but for” analysis, condemning
conduct that “would make no economic sense . . . but for the
tendency” to eliminate competition.238 Firms that satisfy the test
often operate at a loss to push out competitors who cannot sustain
comparable deficits without folding.239 Likewise, by refusing to sell
their samples, brand-name firms forego substantial revenue in order
to eliminate generic competition.240
Notwithstanding the sacrificed profits from a discounted wholesale
price or an ordinary retail price, brand-name firms also forsake a

234. Id. at 610–11.
235. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 284 (2d Cir.
1979) (reproaching a firm “with monopoly power in one market to gain a
competitive advantage in another by refusing to sell a rival the monopolized goods or
services he needs to compete effectively in the second market”).
236. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610.
237. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
239. See Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th Cir. 2013)
(worrying that “a dominant firm may be able to forgo short-term profits longer than
smaller rivals” to “drive rivals from the market”); supra notes 148–49 and
accompanying text.
240. See Novell, 731 F.3d at 1075 (agonizing that “[g]iving up short-term profits . . .
may risk doing less to enhance competition and consumer interests . . . and enable
[the brand-name firm] to extract monopoly rents once the competitor is killed off or
beaten down”); infra notes 254–60 and accompanying text (rationalizing that generic
firms cannot economically survive by enduring the same challenges for approval that
brand-name firms endure).
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high-yield, premium sales price by refusing to sell their samples.241
Indeed, brand-name firms still comply with the Sherman Act even if
they choose to sell their samples to generic firms at a premium,
generating a high profit margin. When manipulating REMS,
however, brand-name firms offer no sales price for their samples. In
other words, “but for” a brand-name firm’s “tendency” to eliminate
generic competition so it can prevent potentially enormous losses
looming from generic market entry and reduced prices, it would have
sold its samples.242 For example, the firm in Matsushita expelled
competition by operating at a loss and forfeiting revenue; likewise,
brand-name firms expel generic competition and avoid losing market
share by refusing premium sales and forfeiting substantial revenue.243
A for-profit firm operating at less-than-full capacity epitomizes
exclusionary conduct.244 Thus, the willingness to sacrifice not only a
sale, but a high-yield premium sale, suggests that a brand-name’s
refusal was motivated by “anticompetitive malice” rather than
“competitive zeal,” which establishes exclusionary intent.245
b.

Refusing to sell denies generic firms an “essential facility”

Above all, brand-name firms possess an “essential facility” to which
generic firms need access in order to offer a product and lower prices
241. See Novell, 731 F.3d at 1073 (arguing that if courts were required to “pick and
choose” the appropriate price, it would only “risk judicial complicity in collusion and
dampen[] price competition”); VBR Tours, LLC v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No.
14-cv-00804, 2015 WL 5693735, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2015) (failing to state an
antitrust claim even though the defendant removed its “discount, raising the cost of
[its] tickets from wholesale to retail price[]”). Notwithstanding the discretion to
charge a premium, brand-name firms do not enjoy an unfettered choice of price.
See, e.g., Safeway Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Nos. C 07-05470 CW, C 07-5985 CW, C 07-6120
CW, C 07-5702 CW, 2010 WL 147988, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (stating that
“imposing a 400 percent increase in price” was sufficient “to show that this pricing
conduct could have been motivated by anticompetitive malice”).
242. Compare Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 950–51 (6th
Cir. 2005) (holding that dropping prices and operating at a loss to eliminate
competition satisfies the “no economic sense” test), with Novell, 731 F.3d at 1080
(accepting the monopolist’s “rationales” and rejecting the “no economic sense” test).
243. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595–97
(1986); supra note 173 (rationalizing the need for such a method by noting that, on
average, generic drugs cost seventy percent less than their brand-name equivalents).
244. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 580–81 (satisfying the “no economic sense” test
because the defendant was operating at less-than-full capacity and needed to
“operate at something approaching full capacity in order to make a profit”).
245. See, e.g., Tucker v. Apple Comput., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (N.D. Cal.
2006). But see supra note 147 (addressing the criticisms of the modern profit sacrifice
test).
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for consumers.246
Inventing, manufacturing, and marketing a
Despite the
pharmaceutical drug is extremely expensive.247
astronomical research and development costs that brand-name firms
must endure to pioneer a new drug, they recoup their investment costs
by charging correspondingly high sales prices.248 Generic market entry,
therefore, is of the utmost importance because it creates competition,
consequently cutting consumer costs.249 By functioning as the sole
gatekeeper to vital, life-saving drugs, brand-name firms single-handedly
preclude generic competition, preserve excessive prices, and risk patient
health by setting a hurdle sometimes too high to climb.
Firms may not deny competitors an “essentially facility” that they
require to function. In Otter Tail, for example, a single company
owned the sole means of distribution of electric power in a service area
and refused to provide access to competitors attempting to enter the
market.250 Since then, courts have determined that if a product or
facility is under a monopolist’s exclusive control, the monopolist may
not, under some circumstances, refuse to sell access to competitors.251
In other words, monopolists may not deny a competitor a product or
facility that a competitor requires to function and is unable to
“practically or reasonably . . . duplicate” itself.252
Refusing access to these facilities is more than a deterrent; it
realistically precludes most competition.
Consumer welfare
welcomes more players in the market because competition drives
down prices, but, practically, firms cannot invest in costly capital
expenditures and maintain low prices.253 Capital expenditures,

246. See generally Waller, supra note 163, at 359 (discussing the current framework
for the essential facilities doctrine).
247. See supra note 24 (estimating that initial research and development,
marketing, and manufacturing costs are over $2.5 billion to bring a new brand-name
drug to market).
248. See supra notes 119, 212 and accompanying text.
249. Devon M. Herrick, What Is Increasing the Cost of Generic Drugs? (Part II:
Regulatory and Legal Reasons), NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/what-is-increasing-the-cost-of-generic-drugs-part-iiregulatory-and-legal-reasons (articulating that the “FDA needs to clear the backlog of
applications and allow [generic] competition to flourish” because this “would
alleviate some of the price hikes caused by market consolidation”).
250. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973).
251. Upadhye & Lang, supra note 65, at 100.
252. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983).
253. Cf. Richard M. Lipton, Economic Substance—Two District Courts Reach Differing
Conclusions in Very Different Contexts, 110 J. TAX’N 170, 177 (2009) (discussing an oil
company that, because of its “capital expenditures toward acquiring and aggressively
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though in many cases worthwhile in the end, require an enormous
amount of capital—usually from debt, equity, or surplus.254
Notwithstanding the unlikelihood that firms possess enough capital
surplus, investors are similarly unlikely to finance these projects
because it is not economically feasible for a firm wishing to enter a
new market to take such a risk. A new cellphone provider, for
example, cannot profit and remain viable by constructing its own cell
tower; instead, it needs access to an already-existing cell tower.255
Without such access, the cellphone provider chooses one of two
options: it either purchases access from a competitor’s cell tower or
abandons its market entry.256
Generic pharmaceutical firms are trapped in a similar dichotomy.
A brand-name sample is the functional equivalent of a cell tower,
telephonic network, bridge, or similar utility system: without access
to a brand-name sample, producing a generic drug is economically
infeasible. Recall that generic firms must demonstrate that their
drug is the “bioequivalent” of a corresponding brand-name drug to
obtain abbreviated market entry.257
Logistically, establishing
bioequivalence is grueling, if not impossible, without a brand-name
sample.258 Without one, the only other way to bring a generic drug to
market is to complete the same laborious and expensive laboratory
testing that the brand-name firm undertakes.259 Unlike brand-name
firms, however, generic firms lack the ability to recoup their research
and development costs because they share the market with
competitors.260 Like the new cellphone provider without the capacity
developing properties it believed to have tremendous potential,” could not feasibly
produce low oil prices).
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1(g) (2012) (defining a capital expenditure “as [a costly]
expense of operation and maintenance,” which “substantially changes the services of
the facility”); Kee H. Chung et al., Investment Opportunities and Market Reaction to Capital
Expenditure Decisions, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 41, 42 (1998) (asserting that capital
expenditures for “public utility firms” are not as profitable as other industries).
255. See KANG, supra note 198, at 74 (discussing the “high up-front, fixed costs” of
the telephony industry, which require a “[h]igh initial investment”).
256. See id.
257. See supra Section I.A.3 (describing the process in which a generic drug is
approved).
258. See supra Section I.A.3.
259. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
260. See KANG, supra note 198, at 74 (contending that a new firm, “to attract
customers,” will not survive if it matches an incumbent price, so it must set its “price
below its own cost of production and therefore operate at a loss”). Moreover, brandname drugs do not “compete” in the same sense because they possess patent
exclusivity, furnishing them the liberty to charge higher prices.
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to invest in a costly capital expenditure, generic firms lack the same
economic opportunity. As a result, a brand-name firm’s refusal to sell
samples denies generic firms an “essential facility” and indicates
exclusionary intent because it practically precludes generic market
entry, which preserves elevated prices and misappropriates millions
of dollars in savings from consumers.
2.

Product hopping constitutes exclusionary conduct
Following the analysis put forth in Actavis, courts should similarly
examine product hopping under an “enhanced” rule of reason,
demonstrating a brand-name firm’s anticompetitive conduct.261
Here, the central inquiry is whether slightly altering a product and remarketing it is exclusionary conduct.262 Brand-name firms that
possess monopoly power by means of their patent’s exclusivity should
not be allowed to wield that power perpetually to preclude generic
market entry.263 To do so would eliminate consumer choice,
epitomizing exclusionary conduct.264
a.

Coercing consumers is exclusionary

Eliminating consumer choice effectively precludes competition and
is indicative of unlawful exclusion. To prevail, generic firms need not
establish a brand-name’s actual intent to exclude competition; rather,
generics need only demonstrate a firm’s slight alteration eliminated
consumer choice.265 The inference itself supplants the need to show

261. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (defining product hopping).
262. See In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust
Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (examining product hopping by
asking “whether the defendant combined the introduction of a new product . . . such
that the comprehensive effect is likely to stymie competition, prevent consumer
choice[,] and reduce the market’s ambit”).
263. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.3d 263, 274 (2d Cir.
1979) (disputing that a “monopolist may not wield [its power] to prevent or impede
competition,” even if its “power [was] legitimately acquired”).
264. See Namenda, 787 F.3d 638, 652 (2d Cir. 2015) (maintaining that “[w]ellestablished case law makes clear that product redesign is anticompetitive when it
coerces consumers and impedes competition”), cert. dismissed sub nom. Allergan PLC
v. New York ex rel. Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015); supra notes 167–78 and
accompanying text (explaining the facts behind product hopping).
265. In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 682 (“[S]imply introducing a new product on
the market, whether it is a superior product or not, does not, by itself, constitute
exclusionary conduct. The key question is whether the [monopolist] combined the
introduction of a new product with some other wrongful conduct, such that the
comprehensive effect is likely to stymie competition, prevent consumer choice[,] and
reduce the market’s ambit.”); see also Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
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actual intent, focusing more on the alteration’s effect rather than its
By discarding potential competitors and eliminating
cause.266
consumer autonomy, monopolists artificially extend their exclusivity
and force consumers to choose between either paying a steep
premium for the product or forgoing the consumption. In the
pharmaceutical industry, however, the alternative to paying is a
uniquely perilous choice for consumers: they must forgo their
medication and put their health at risk. Thus, focusing on consumer
choice appropriately tempers vehement brand-name preclusion.
Pharmaceutical commerce is not the only industry in which
consumer coercion appears. For instance, in the textbook market,
preclusion ploys and predatory pricing regularly ravage consumers.267
While Hatch-Waxman strives to be a champion for pharmaceutical
consumers, federal copyright laws attempt the same for textbook
consumers.268 Despite that effort, students continue to pay excessive
prices for textbooks, which often account for over one-third of their
total cost of attendance.269 Like brand-name firms hopping from drug
to drug, authors frequently publish new textbook editions, forcing
students to pay a premium for their newest version.270 The elevated

Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735–36 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that “the test is whether the
[monopolist’s] acts, otherwise lawful, were unreasonably restrictive of competition”).
266. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) (maintaining
that acquiring “the power to exclude competitors from any part of the trade or
commerce” is unlawful “provided that they have the intent and purpose to exercise
that power”).
267. See, e.g., Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90, 91–92, 96 (3d
Cir. 1982) (withstanding summary judgment when students alleged a university
attempted to monopolize the sale of undergraduate textbooks).
268. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122 (2012); Gary Minda, Monopoly Pricing on Campus:
New York’s Textbook Access Act, 29 PACE L. REV. 523, 538 (2009) (comparing the
textbook market to the drug industry and recommending that textbooks adopt a
“generic textbook alternative”).
269. Allie Bidwell, Report: High Textbook Prices Have Students Struggling, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Jan. 28, 2014, 9:28 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/
01/28/report-high-textbook-prices-have-college-students-struggling (finding that, on
average, students spend $1200 each year on textbooks, accounting for, on average,
fourteen percent of tuition at four-year universities and thirty-nine percent of tuition
at community colleges).
270. See Minda, supra note 268, at 534 (contending that “faculty should be subject
to disclosure requirements, explaining why a higher cost, newer edition textbook is
necessary”).
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prices vexing consumers are a direct result of the lack of competition
caused by brand-name firms and publishing companies.271
Pharmaceutical firms undeniably control the ability to modify their
products,272 but the Sherman Act’s proscription against precluding
competition supersedes any economically advantageous modification
that also harms consumer welfare.273 In Berkey Photo, a competing firm
accused Kodak of using its monopoly power in the camera market to
preclude competition.274
The court concluded that consumers
maintained their free choice, despite the introduction of a new product,
because the old product was still available on the market.275 In contrast,
in Namenda, the court upheld a preliminary injunction in favor of the
generic firm, again paying particular attention to consumer choice: the
brand-name firm withdrew its old drug, forcing renewing consumers to
purchase its new drug.276 Thus, introducing a new product while
simultaneously removing an old product supports the inference that
the brand-name firm sought to preclude competition.277
271. See id. at 531 (“The key to maintaining low competitive prices is the
availability of substitute products in the market.”); Bidwell, supra note 269 (asserting
that “[t]he problem . . . comes from a lack of competition in the textbook market”).
272. Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, No. CV 0506419 MRP (AJWx), 2008 WL 7346921, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2008) (conceding that
the “introduction of new products cannot, in and of itself, violate Section 2”); see also
Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir.
1979) (maintaining that firms are under “no duty to help” one another).
273. See Namenda, 787 F.3d 638, 652 (2d Cir. 2015) (accepting that “case law
makes clear that product redesign is anticompetitive when it coerces consumers and
impedes competition”), cert. dismissed sub nom. Allergan PLC v. New York ex rel.
Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
274. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 267–68 (2d Cir.
1979).
275. See id. at 281–88.
276. See Namenda, 787 F.3d at 649, 658 (“In withdrawing [the once-daily drug]
from the market, [the firm’s] explicit purpose was to impede generic competition
and to avoid the patent cliff—which occurs at the end of a drug’s exclusivity period
when generics gain market share through state substitution laws.”).
277. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., 12-3824, 2015 WL
1736957, at *12, *18 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (ruling against the generic firm on
summary judgment because “doctors remained free to prescribe” the generic
version, “pharmacists remained free to substitute [it],” and “patients remained free
to ask their doctors and pharmacists for [it]”), aff’d, No. 15-2236, 2016 WL 5403626
(3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016); In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride &
Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 682, 684 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (denying the
brand-name firm’s motion to dismiss because the “threatened removal of the tablets
from the market in conjunction with the alleged fabricated safety concerns could
plausibly coerce patients and doctors to switch from tablet to film”); Walgreen Co. v.
AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (D.D.C. 2008) (ruling against the
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Avoiding an examination of a product’s superiority

Although it may seem natural to do so when analyzing alleged
product hopping, courts should avoid an inquiry that contemplates
whether a newly-modified product is “superior” compared to its older
one because it is beyond their expertise.278 Such an inquiry
improperly compels courts to compare products, extensively
investigate markets, and ultimately quantify a new drug’s value to
society.279 Lacking a comprehensive understanding of medicine and
pharmaceutical engineering, the disadvantage of allowing such an
inquiry is obvious: judges function better in a black robe than a white
lab coat. However diligent a court may be, this misplaced argument
reduces the inquiry to personal preference rather than superior
ingenuity or societal value.280 Consumer coercion, on the other
hand, is a more effective litmus test that focuses on objective market
behavior. Requiring a brand-name firm temporarily to maintain its
older product on the market allows consumers, rather than courts, to
evince a new product’s value by choosing whether to purchase it.281
Therefore, a finding that product hopping constitutes exclusionary
conduct deters brand-name firms from executing pernicious
practices that effectively preclude generic market entry, which in turn
protects vulnerable pharmaceutical consumers.282

generic firm on a motion to dismiss because the older drug “remains available as a
consumer choice”); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 422 (D.
Del. 2006) (denying the brand-name firm’s motion to dismiss because “consumers were
not presented with a choice” between formulations); see also Berkey Photo, 603 F.3d at
286 n.30 (reasoning that rather than “the production introduction itself,” an
additional, anticompetitive motive is required to support a section 2 violation).
278. See, e.g., Namenda, 787 F.3d at 653–55.
279. See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 287 (contending that the “only question that can
be answered is whether there is sufficient demand for a particular product to make
its production worthwhile”).
280. See id. (discarding a court’s ability to “determine with any reasonable
assurance whether one product is ‘superior’ to another,” positing that such a query
“is a matter of individual taste”).
281. See id. (positing that determining whether “sufficient demand for a particular
product to make its production worthwhile . . . can only be inferred from the
reaction of the market”).
282. See id. at 279 (alleging that “Kodak, a film and camera monopolist, was in
[the unique] position to set industry standards”); Minda, supra note 268, at 524–25
(“[T]extbook publishers are in the same position as drug makers; they offer unique
products protected by intellectual property rights (patent, copyright, and trademark
protection) and benefit from the moral hazard of having doctors or professors
require the drug or the book without regard to the cost ultimately paid by the
consumer. The person who buys the product does not get to choose it, and hence
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D. The “Legitimate Business” Defense Is No “Get Out of Jail Free” Card
Applying the rule of reason in the pharmaceutical patent context,
brand-name firms often proffer procompetitive justifications, attempting
to defend their conduct’s anticompetitive effects. They contend that
their alleged REMS manipulation or product hopping exhibits a
“legitimate business purpose” immune from suit.283 However, neither
apology nor excuse should inoculate conduct that ultimately prevents
ailing consumers from attaining life-saving pharmaceuticals.
The “legitimate business” defense carries with it the potential for
abuse. Executives, not judges, manage private companies, and firms
irrefutably remain entitled to make business decisions that maximize
profits.284 Nonetheless, such a notion does not save the day for a
brand-name firm. Although firms are free to choose with whom they
deal, they are not granted unfettered discretion to preclude generic
market entry.285 Firms may not avoid antitrust scrutiny by merely
asserting that their conduct serves an economic, self-interested
purpose.286 They often characterize their exclusionary conduct as
such to shield liability, but the doctrine should not function as a
vaccine for gluttonous firms, especially considering the industry’s
general susceptibility to abuse.287 Granting a brand-name firm

the price of the product is something that becomes merely what one needs to pay if
he or she wants either medical treatment or an education.”).
283. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (detailing examples of the
“legitimate business” defense and its application).
284. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009);
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985)
(explaining that “[a monopolist that] refuses to deal with a competitor in some
manner does not violate Section 2 if valid business reasons exist for that refusal”).
285. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 601 (conceding that a firm’s right to refuse to
deal with others is not “unqualified”).
286. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (asserting that a
“business [may] freely” choose with whom to deal except where its motivation is to
“obtain or maintain a monopoly”); Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (enunciating that a business decision’s “‘anticompetitive evils’ . . . must be
carefully balanced against its ‘procompetitive virtues’ to ascertain whether the
former outweigh the latter” (quoting Milton Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust
Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term—1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 983
(1977))). But see, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 12-3824,
2015 WL 1736957, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (accepting a brand-name firm’s
legitimate business purpose and consequently granting it summary judgment), aff’d,
No. 15-2236, 2016 WL 5403626 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016).
287. See In re Thalomid & Revlimid Antitrust Litig., No. CV 14-6997, 2015 WL
9589217, at *15 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (explaining that “being motivated by anticompetitive goals” is “sufficient to conclude that [a] refusal to deal violated the
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immunity through this defense would not only frustrate an
underlying purpose of Hatch-Waxman, but it would also render
federal antitrust law superfluous.288 Accordingly, courts should apply
a bright-line rule prohibiting firms from asserting the “legitimate
business” defense when they find that a firm’s REMS manipulation or
product hopping is exclusionary.
1.

Honoring the Sherman Act
While a business decision resulting in market exclusivity is clearly
economically beneficial to that firm, it can be equally destructive to
consumer welfare.289 If mere profitability were the sole standard,
firms would rarely—and possibly never—violate section 2, and
pharmaceutical prices would become unaffordable.290 Precluding
competition permits the monopolist to set supracompetitive prices
with no threat of losing market share to lower-priced alternatives.
Judges, however, are not economists and should not balance a
business decision’s economic standing with its market effects. If,
after applying an “enhanced” rule of reason, a generic firm proves
that a brand-name firm precluded generic competition by either
manipulating REMS or product hopping, courts should bar brandname firms from asserting the “legitimate business” defense.291
Demonstrating a brand-name firm’s predatory ploy elucidates its
anticompetitive intentions and should accordingly extinguish the
“legitimate business” defense, thereby providing relief to consumers.

Sherman Act”); supra Section III.A (illustrating the pharmaceutical industry’s
vulnerability to abuse due to its high, upfront costs and consumer-price disconnect).
288. See infra Sections III.C.1–2.
289. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967)
(contending that a firm’s “self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of reason to
immunize otherwise illegal conduct,” and only conduct that “is not unlawful in its
impact in the marketplace” will survive antitrust attack), overruled on other grounds by
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1977) (overturning the
decision to apply a bright line rule finding that vertical trade restrictions are always
detrimental to consumers); City of Chanute v. Williams Nat. Gas Co., 678 F. Supp.
1517, 1534 (D. Kan. 1988) (same).
290. See United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 312 (N.D.
Ohio 1949) (condemning firms that “form[] for the purpose . . . to fix prices and to
eliminate competition,” and warning that they cannot “circumvent the law by entering
into agreements purportedly to protect [such motives]”), modified by 341 U.S. 593
(1951), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
291. See supra Sections III.B–C (arguing for an “enhanced” rule of reason and
finding that REMS manipulation and product hopping constitute exclusionary conduct).
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2.

Upholding the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act
Relatedly, courts should rebuff brand-name firms asserting the
“legitimate business” defense when they preclude generic market
entry because allowing such a defense would frustrate an underlying
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act. In passing Hatch-Waxman,
Congress’s aims were two-fold: (1) maintain brand-name exclusivity to
develop new drugs and (2) expedite generic market entry to lower
consumer costs.292 With these goals in mind, forcing a sale of samples
or prohibiting product hopping are unlikely to frustrate either
purpose: neither action would diminish pharmaceutical innovation,
nor would they impede generic market entry. First, by continuing to
respect patent exclusivity terms, brand-name firms would still maintain
the ability to charge steep prices initially to recoup capital, settle debts,
and invest in new drugs.293 Of course, brand-name firms already do
this, commonly charging five times the price of corresponding
generics.294 And second, rather than impede generic competition,
rejecting such a defense would expedite generic market entry upon
the natural conclusion of a brand-name patent’s life.
REMS
manipulation and product hopping preclude generic competition;295
when brand-name firms employ such tactics, courts should disallow the
“legitimate business” defense because it would frustrate HatchWaxman and effectively grant brand-name firms market isolation.
Such market isolation allows brand-name firms to charge consumers
unaffordable prices, sometimes impeding their road to recovery.

292. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1194
(10th Cir. 2009) (elucidating that ski resort financiers can “recoup” their investments
by “increas[ing] the price of lift tickets, rais[ing] room rates, serv[ing] only high-priced
food, or, as it seems to have chosen, delv[ing] more deeply into the rental ski market”).
294. Upadhye & Lang, supra note 65, at 86; see also Facts About Generic Drugs, supra
note 23 (contending that, “[o]n average, the cost of a generic drug is 80 to 85
percent lower than the brand name product,” saving consumers “an average of $3
billion every week”). Patients find that pharmaceutical prices vary wildly, even
among generic drugs. See Sy Mukherjee, Study: CVS, Rite Aid, And Other Chain
Pharmacies Sell Generic Drugs at up to 18 Times Their Cost, THINKPROGRESS (May 29,
2015, 5:50 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/03/29/1798061/chainpharmacies-generic-drugs; Same Generic Drug, Many Prices, CONSUMER REP. (May
2013), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2013/05/same-generic-dru
g-many-prices/index.htm (describing one study that found, on average,
“blockbuster” generic drugs sold for 447% higher than other generics).
295. See supra Sections III.C.1–2 (explaining how REMS manipulation and product
hopping constitute exclusionary conduct).
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Allowing the defense facilitates REMS manipulation

First, courts should prohibit brand-name firms from asserting the
“legitimate business” defense when they manipulate REMS.296 Brandname firms assert that mandatory dealing opens them up to product
liability, damages their reputation, potentially triggers additional
mandated REMS, and even instigates their drug’s removal from the
market.297 However, firms retain the option to contractually indemnify
themselves or charge a premium to offset potential liability.
Furthermore, brand-name firms’ pleas for a laissez-faire
pharmaceutical regulatory scheme are further undermined by
Congress’s intent, as evidenced by its plain language prohibiting firms
from “block[ing] or delay[ing]” ANDAs and its bioequivalence
requirement.298 Congress did not intend for REMS to prevent generic
firms from market entry, but rather it sought to protect consumers
from risky drugs.299 Regardless of whether a brand-name firm sacrifices
profits or denies generic firms an “essential facility,” either theory
infers an intent to preclude generic market entry and should bar
brand-name firms from asserting the “legitimate business” defense.300
Allowing such a defense would only permit brand-name firms to deny
generic firms the samples they need to function, effectively
undermining antitrust safeguards at the expense of consumers.

296. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 599
(1985) (concluding that “no valid business reason [exists] for refusing” a transaction
that would have otherwise been profitable). Although the Supreme Court has held
that a firm “has no obligation” to grant others access to its patented product, see
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945) (explaining that a
“patent owner . . . . [has] no obligation either to use it or to grant its use to others”),
the Court has never held that such a proposition applies to pharmaceutical patents.
Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry operates under a unique regulatory framework
and is thus entitled to similar accommodations in the “refusal to deal” context. See,
e.g., supra Section III.A (discussing the pharmaceutical industry’s price disconnect
and vulnerability to abuse).
297. Tucker et al., supra note 65, at 77.
298. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012) (“No holder of an approved covered
application shall use any [ETASUs] required . . . to block or delay approval of . . . a
drug that is the subject of an [ANDA].”); § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(viii).
299. See supra notes 122–23, 128 and accompanying text (describing various
consumer protections and purporting that Congress contemplated abuse by brandname firms).
300. See supra Section III.C.1 (establishing that a brand-name firm’s refusal to deal
constitutes exclusionary conduct).
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Allowing the defense facilitates product hopping

Second, courts should prohibit brand-name firms from asserting
the “legitimate business” defense when they engage in product
hopping.301 A pharmaceutical firm should not be able to justify
consumer coercion, as evident by the simultaneous introduction of a
new product and withdrawal of an old one, merely by demonstrating
its profit-earning potential. Such conduct certainly yields profits, but
it also precludes generic market entry.302 Because Hatch-Waxman
requires a generic drug to be identical to its brand-name counterpart,
any slight alteration causes generic firms to start their market entry
all over again. Repeatedly forcing generic firms to restart their
ANDA process exhausts capital, depletes resources, and causes
manufacturing costs to exceed probable profit, rendering it
economically infeasible for generic firms to pursue market entry and
pass savings on to consumers. Product hopping consequently
preserves high prices without providing consumers any practicable
alternative; thus, courts should ban the immunity that brand-name
firms seek from the “legitimate business” defense.
3.

Preventing brand-names from being pharma’s gatekeepers
Lastly, courts should prohibit brand-name firms from asserting the
“legitimate business” defense so those firms cannot act as the sole
gatekeepers to the pharmaceutical industry.303 For example, hospitals
confront much of the same coercion seen in the pharmaceutical
industry. To combat astronomical healthcare costs and avoid oversaturated markets, some state legislatures enacted certificate-of-need
(CON) laws.304 CON laws attempt to protect consumer welfare by

301. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); supra Section
III.C.1.
302. See Ross D. Petty, Predatory Promotion: A Theory of Antitrust Liability Whose Time
Has Come?, 27 AM. BUS. L.J. 215, 229 (1989) (“[A]ntitrust cases also have condemned
product modifications that appear to be exclusionary and offer no genuine
innovation to consumers.”).
303. Brand-name firms assert a variety of different business purposes for their
timely modifications. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No.
12-3824, 2015 WL 1736957, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (arguing that a product
hop is justified because of (1) shelf-life stability, (2) risk of injury with capsules
compared to tablets, (3) concerns from international regulators, (4) potential
esophageal injury from capsules, and (5) dosing flexibility), aff’d, No. 15-2236, 2016
WL 5403626 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016).
304. See Patrick John McGinley, Comment, Beyond Health Care Reform: Reconsidering
Certificate of Need Laws in a “Managed Competition” System, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 141,
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requiring a state agency to approve all “hospital expansions and
major equipment purchases.”305 CON laws, however, shortsightedly
achieve just the opposite and effectively perpetuate high healthcare
costs.306 Because market entry depends upon agency approval, CON
laws restrict market entry, insulate incumbents from competition, and
As a result, many state
ultimately preserve inflated costs.307
legislatures have repudiated CON laws altogether.308
Resembling the framework in CON laws, the pharmaceutical
industry can expect a similar prognosis if courts continue to grant
brand-name firms carte blanche.
Indeed, the hospital and
pharmaceutical markets share many attributes: both operate in
monopolistic markets where entry is laborious, expensive, and
fraught with regulatory barriers.309 Comparably, REMS manipulation
and product hopping insulate monopolists from competition and

143 (1995) (contending that such a model “encourage[s] price competition among
health care providers” by “attempt[ing] to lower costs by managing demand”).
305. See id.
306. See Gerard R. Goulet, Certificate-of-Need over Hospitals in Rhode Island: A FortyYear Retrospective, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 127, 128–29 (2010) (maintaining that
“conclusive evidence” exists that CON laws “constrain costs”); Andrew Kitchenman,
Explainer: Certificate of Need Determines Fate of Healthcare Facilities in NJ, NJ SPOTLIGHT
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/15/12/14/explainer-certificate
-of-need-determines-which-healthcare-facilities-open-close
(expounding
the
controversial nature of CON laws, citing major delays in projects); see also, e.g., Owen
S. Mudge, Jr. & Allan Gibofsky, The Developing Application of Antitrust Laws to Hospital
Mergers, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 355, 367 (1994) (reasoning that Tennessee’s CON law
“significantly impairs” competition and preserves high prices).
307. See Milton L. Cruz, Product and Geographical Market Measurements in the Merger of
Hospitals, 91 DICK. L. REV. 497, 513 (1986) (conceptualizing that CON laws make
market entry “difficult,” so “hospitals are in a position to raise prices without entering
immediate competition”).
308. Certificate of Need: State Health Law and Programs, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-ofneed-state-laws.aspx (asserting that, despite the controversial nature of CON laws, as
of 2014, about thirty-six states retain the laws in some form); see also Dani Kass, DOJ,
FTC Back SC Bill to End Certificate-of-Need Laws, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2016, 9:11 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/745225/doj-ftc-back-sc-bill-to-end-certificate-ofneed-laws (recounting the DOJ’s and FTC’s efforts to eliminate the CON law in
South Carolina).
309. Compare supra notes 253–59 and accompanying text (discussing the
pharmaceutical industry and capital expenditures, emphasizing the expensive and
time-consuming process that deters investors), with Cruz, supra note 307, at 502
(explicating that the hospital industry has “low cross-elasticity,” such that “[i]f a
hospital increases the prices it charges for certain services, a group of investors
cannot get together and build a hospital to compete with the existing hospital
without obtaining a [CON]”).
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generate the same price inflations as CON laws.310 In enforcing CON
laws, state agencies failed to be adequate gatekeepers for hospital
market entry; so, why should brand-name firms dictate when—or if—
generic drugs may enter their markets?311 Allowing the “legitimate
business” defense would permit brand-name firms to function as the
pharmaceutical industry’s ultimate gatekeepers, essentially rendering
both Hatch-Waxman and the Sherman Act superfluous.312
The FDA, however, is not equipped to handle the pharmaceutical
industry’s enforcement matters, so courts should entrust antitrust law
to fill the void.313
Because brand-name firms are unlawfully
extending their market exclusivity to escalate prices, they should not
benefit from a defense designed to protect consumer welfare. Simply
put, their procompetitive justification—their economic benefit—
never outweighs their anticompetitive effects. Therefore, courts
should refuse to immunize brand-name firms that misuse the
“legitimate business” defense to preclude generic competition and
raise prices to supra-competitive levels, thereby harming consumers.
LANDING ON “PARK PLACE”
The pharmaceutical industry is comprised of many moving parts.
Market entry, for instance, requires unusually high research and
development costs. Additionally, unlike consumers in other industries,
the pharmaceutical consumer is essentially unable to “shop around,”
yielding market influence to prescribing physicians and third party

310. See supra notes 18–19 (discussing recent, perilous pharmaceutical price
increases).
311. See, e.g., Safeway Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 761 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882–83 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (lacking antitrust scrutiny, a brand-name firm “raised the price . . . of Norvir
from $1.71 to $8.57, which amounted to a 400-percent increase . . . . [when its]
previous price increases averaged 3.45 percent”).
312. In addition, brand-name firms are perpetuating fraud, falsely claiming that
they have a “new” product. See In re Thalomid & Revlimid Antitrust Litig., No. CV 146697, 2015 WL 9589217, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (entertaining an argument
that a brand-name firm “engaged in sham litigation . . . by committing fraud on [a
federal agency], stripping it of any immunity”); cf. FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258
U.S. 483, 493 (1922) (stressing that “misbrand[ing] goods” to attract consumers by
fraud is not entitled to a defense).
313. See Darrow, supra note 208, at 403 (deeming the FDA inefficient gatekeepers
of the pharmaceutical industry); cf. Sarah Butcher, Note, Fraud-on-the-FDA and
Genetically Modified Foods: Will the Action Stand?, 22 REV. LITIG. 669, 705 (2003) (“The
FDA seems rather unprepared for the possibility that a company might perpetuate a
fraud by concealing important information about a [genetically modified] food.”).

LEVY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

302

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/31/2016 8:18 PM

[Vol. 66:247

insurers. With such a volatile system, one glitch can cause harmful side
effects for those that need prescription drugs the most.
Indeed, the smallest fracture can cause the entire system to
crumble. By enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress sought to
expedite generic market entry, yet preserve pharmaceutical
innovation. While Congress accommodated both brand-name and
generic firms, one underlying goal motivated the legislation: the
desire to protect consumer welfare. Nevertheless, unforeseen gaps in
the statute have splintered consumer protections. In an unusually
vulnerable industry, corporate avidity has turned those gaps into
chasms. Specifically, brand-name firms’ REMS manipulation and
product hopping have prevented generic market entry and
devastated consumers with unaffordable prices.
Without a watchdog in their corner, pharmaceutical companies
possess seemingly unfettered control of the drug market. Antitrust
scrutiny, however, effectively protects consumers, and the rule of
reason prescribes a balancing test to determine whether a firm’s
conduct is exclusionary. Although meticulous at times, judicial
review of such matters ultimately conserves resources and saves
pharmaceutical consumers billions of dollars. Courts should use
Actavis as a model, interpreting it as an “enhanced” rule of reason test
specific to the pharmaceutical industry, and use it to examine REMS
exploitation and product hopping. Moreover, because of the
industry’s limitations, courts should also prohibit a brand-name firm
from asserting the “legitimate business” defense once they find that it
precluded competition.
First, manipulating REMS constitutes exclusionary conduct.
Brand-name firms refusing to sell their samples to generic firms, at
any price, forsakes profits and makes “no economic sense,”
supporting an inference of anticompetitive malice. Furthermore,
their refusal denies generic firms an essential facility. Lacking the
ability to charge high prices and recoup their invested capital, it is
not economically feasible for generic firms to compete without access
to such a fundamental resource, effectively eliminating the possibility
of market entry.
Second, product hopping also represents
exclusionary conduct. Hopping from product to product coerces
consumers and prevents them from purchasing cheaper alternatives.
Lastly, courts should apply a bright-line rule prohibiting brandname firms from asserting the “legitimate business” defense when
precluding generic competition. Most exclusionary conduct is
economically profitable; if mere profitability was the quintessential
factor, courts’ allowance of the defense would undermine both
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Hatch-Waxman and the Sherman Act. Inherently, brand-name firms
encounter a conflict of interest if they function as gatekeepers to the
pharmaceutical marketplace.
To be clear, examining pharmaceutical patent litigation through
an “enhanced” rule of reason in no way shortens the lives of
otherwise valid patents. Exclusivity from patents is crucial because it
allows brand-name firms to recoup their investments and devote
more capital to pioneering new drugs. Forbidding brand-name firms
from gaming the system merely prevents them from using their
patents anticompetitively. By impeding generic competition, they
essentially grant themselves market exclusivity and thereby
misappropriate enormous profits at the consumer’s expense.
Rather than shield brand-name firms, courts should apply antitrust
scrutiny to uphold the underlying purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
preserve competition, and, most importantly, defend consumers from
the pharmaceutical industry’s voracious grip. Without generic
competition, brand-name firms occupy an unregimented and
indefinite monopoly, thus allowing them to charge unaffordable
prices. Millions of Americans like Jacqueline Racener and Stuart
Chapin, though suffering from illness, also ache for consumer relief.
The Act’s purpose was to protect consumers; instead, the Act is
perpetuating abuse. Consumers are consistently landing on “Park
Place,” and brand-name firms are forcing them to pay
supracompetitive prices for their prescriptions, bankrupting them in
the process. Mirroring Actavis and applying an “enhanced” rule of
reason to pharmaceutical patent litigation repairs the rules of the
game and adequately protects consumers against predatory conduct
like REMS manipulation and product hopping. Such a fix allocates a
sufficient profit to brand-name firms pioneering new life-saving
drugs, but it also enables consumers to afford those drugs and treat
their illnesses. After all, if the market players price pharmaceuticals
too high to afford, what is the purpose of playing the game?

